

Document of
The World Bank

Report No: ICR00001684

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-39970 TF-90557 TF-53348)

ON AN

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 2.1 MILLION
(US\$ 3.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND A

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$ 4.8 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF GUINEA-BISSAU

FOR A

COASTAL AND BIODIVERSITY MANAGEMENT PROJECT

October 26, 2011

Environment and Natural Resource Management Unit
Sustainable Development Department
AFCF1
Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective April 30, 2011)

Currency Unit = Franc CFA

US\$ 1.00 = FCFA 455.61

US\$ 1.00 = Euro 0.688

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ATL	Local Technical Assistant
CAIA	Environmental and Social Safeguards Unit
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CBMP	Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project
CDL	Local Development Committee
CFF	FIAL Financing Committee
CFP	FIAL Park Committees
CIPA	Center for Applied Fisheries Research
DGA	Director General for Environment
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
ESMF	Environmental and Social Management Framework
EU	European Union
FBG	Bio-Guinea Foundation
FIAL	Fund for Local Environment Initiatives
FIBA	International Foundation of Bank d'Arguin
HIPC	Highly-indebted Poor Country
IBAP	Institute for Biodiversity and Protected Areas
IDA	International Development Association
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
FCFA	Franc: Financial Community of Africa
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GPC	Coastal Planning Cabinet
LDP	Local Development Plan
MENR	Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources
MP	Micro-project
NAP	Protected Areas Unit
PA	Protected Area
PIP	Project Implementation Plan
PF	Process Framework
PMC	Park Management Council
PMU	Project Management Unit
POL	Local Operational Partner
QCBS	Quality and Cost-Based Selection

RFZ	Reserved Fishing Zone
RPF	Resettlement Policy Framework
STP	Permanent Technical Secretariat
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

<p>Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: MacDonald Benjamin (Acting) Sector Manager: Idah Z. Pswarayi-Riddihough Project Team Leader: Liba Strengerowski-Feldblyum ICR Team Leader: Liba Strengerowski-Feldblyum</p>

GUINEA-BISSAU
Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project

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MAP: IBRD 38776

A. Basic Information			
Country:	Guinea-Bissau	Project Name:	Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project
Project ID:	P083453,P049513	L/C/TF Number(s):	IDA-39970,TF-53348,TF-90557
ICR Date:	10/26/2011	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	SIL,SIL	Borrower:	GOV. OF GUINEA-BISSAU
Original Total Commitment:	XDR 2.10M,USD 4.80M	Disbursed Amount:	XDR 2.10M,USD 4.80M
Environmental Category: B,B		Focal Area: B	
Implementing Agencies:			
Ministry of Finance			
Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development			
Ministry of Fisheries			
Office of the Prime Minister			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:			

B. Key Dates				
Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project - P083453				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	08/02/2002	Effectiveness:	03/14/2005	03/14/2005
Appraisal:	03/08/2004	Restructuring(s):		12/21/2005 09/18/2008 03/30/2010
Approval:	11/09/2004	Mid-term Review:	02/04/2008	03/03/2008
		Closing:	03/31/2010	03/31/2011

Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project - P049513				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	03/08/2002	Effectiveness:	01/31/2005	03/14/2005
Appraisal:	03/08/2004	Restructuring(s):		09/18/2008
Approval:	11/09/2004	Mid-term Review:	02/04/2008	03/03/2008
		Closing:	03/31/2010	03/31/2010

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes	Moderately Satisfactory
GEO Outcomes	Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome	Moderate
Risk to GEO Outcome	Moderate
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)			
Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry	Moderately Satisfactory	Government:	Moderately Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Satisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Highly Satisfactory
Overall Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Overall Borrower Performance	Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators			
Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project - P083453			
Implementation Performance	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if any)	Rating:
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality at Entry (QEA)	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality of Supervision (QSA)	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status	Moderately Satisfactory		

Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project - P049513			
Implementation Performance	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if any)	Rating:
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality at Entry (QEA)	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality of Supervision (QSA)	None
GEO rating before Closing/Inactive Status	Moderately Satisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes		
Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project - P083453		
	Original	Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Central government administration	45	50
General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector	45	30
Other social services	10	20
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Biodiversity	25	30
Environmental policies and institutions	25	30
Other environment and natural resources management	13	10
Participation and civic engagement	24	20
Rural non-farm income generation	13	10

Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project - P049513		
	Original	Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Central government administration	20	20
General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector	78	80
Other social services	2	
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Biodiversity	33	35
Environmental policies and institutions	33	35
Participation and civic engagement	17	10
Rural non-farm income generation	17	20

E. Bank Staff		
Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project - P083453		
Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili	Nils O. Tcheyan
Country Director:	McDonald P. Benjamin	Madani M. Tall
Sector Manager:	Idah Z. Pswarayi-Riddihough	Mary A. Barton-Dock
Project Team Leader:	Liba C. Strengerowski-Feldblyum	Peter Kristensen
ICR Team Leader:	Liba C. Strengerowski-Feldblyum	
ICR Primary Author:	Anna F. Roumani	

Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project - P049513		
Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili	Nils O. Tcheyan
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ICR Team Leader:	Liba C. Strengerowski-Feldblyum	
ICR Primary Author:	Anna F. Roumani	

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

The capacity of Government agencies and natural resource users in Guinea-Bissau is strengthened to collaboratively manage coastal environments and biodiversity for both conservation and sustainable development ends

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
Project Development Objectives were not revised.

Global Environment Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

Conservation of globally significant ecosystems and species in Guinea-Bissau strengthened (GEF Operational Program 2).

Revised Global Environment Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
Global Environment Objectives were not revised.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	At least 3,500 sq. km of land and water under improved management according to a score derived from the WWF/World Bank Protected Areas Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool, by end-project.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Cacheu 56; Cantanhez 40; Cufada 54; Joao Vieira e Poilao 65; Orango 63.	3,500 Sq. km. Cacheu 136 (MPA tool); Cantanhez 70 (Terrestrial PA Tool); Cufada 70 (Terrestrial PA Tool); Joao Vieira e Poila o 139 (MPA tool); Orango 139 (MPA		5370 sq km brought under improved mgt. Scores by Jan. 2011 (Year 6): Cacheu 107; Cantanhez 56; Cufada 75; Joao Vieira e Poila o 105; Orango 114.

		tool).		
Date achieved	03/14/2005	03/14/2005		03/31/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Substantial achievement: (i) Cacheu 79% of target; Cantanhez 80%; Cufada 107%; Joao Vieira e Poilao 75.5%; and Orango 82%. (ii) Manatee, Hippo, Elephant, Marine Turtle, Grey Parrot pops. rose (Orango, Cantanhez, Joao Vieira Parks, Bijago Arquipelago)			
Indicator 2 :	As of January 1, 2007, the number of infringements of the applicable regulatory framework related to the Reserved Fishing Zones (RFZ) by fishing vessels decreases by 10% per year in relation to the baseline established in calendar year 2006.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Zero because applicable regulatory framework and monitoring infringements still being finalized.	10% decrease per year	PDO Key Performance Indicator was not changed but related output targets were reduced by MTR.	10% decline
Date achieved	03/14/2005	03/14/2005	09/18/2008	03/31/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved: 10% decline observed by end-project. Supporting Regulatory Framework signed 03/16/2010. Caravela Surveillance Station operational. Buba RFZ established. Baseline established established in 2009.			
Indicator 3 :	As of January 1, 2007, the Government provides sufficient financial resources to cover the operation and maintenance costs of all fisheries surveillance activities (including surveillance stations, vessels and patrols).			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Zero	Sufficient resources for fisheries surveillance by 01/01/2007		Government's contribution totaled US\$183,000. (US\$51,000 in staff salaries; US\$ 90,000 for operation and maintenance of the surveillance stations, vessels and patrols; and US\$ 42,000 for the acquisition of a boat).
Date achieved	03/14/2005	03/14/2005		03/31/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Substantial achievement: Government resources are covering O&M costs of all fisheries surveillance activities; two surveillance boats provided (Gov. of Spain) and active.			
Indicator 4 :	All public and private development projects eligible for review are submitted for environmental impact assessment (EIA) review prior to being implemented.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Zero (institution intended to conduct such reviews was only just being created).	All eligible projects submitted for EIA review.		100% projects now being submitted to CAIA for EIA review

Date achieved	03/14/2005	03/14/2005		03/31/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved 100%. Environmental Impact Assessment Law approved, promulgated and published by 09/2010. CAIA has authority/is reviewing 100% of development proposals.			
Indicator 5 :	75% of FIAL micro-projects funded by the Community Fund (FIAL) each year are considered to have satisfactorily achieved their objectives.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	NA	75%		Exceeded target by Year 6. positive IRRs for FIAL micro projects.
Date achieved	03/14/2005	03/14/2005		03/31/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Fully achieved: Achieved 81.3% by end-project vs target of 75%. Comprised 75% Year 3, 78.3% Year 4, 80.5% Year 5, and 81.3% Year 6. Also IRRs for the five microprojects ranged from 21.17% (lowland rice) to 50.13% (palm oil).			

(b) GEO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Ecosystem health and function maintained or improved within protected areas, their buffer zones, the Biosphere Reserve and fishing reserves.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	This indicator intended to be monitored in same way as PDO KPI 1, the PA and MPA Tracking Tool (see values for KPI 1).	Cacheu 136 (MPA Tool); Cantanhez 70 (Terrestrial PA Tool); Cufada 70 (Terrestrial PA Tool); Joao Vieira/Poilao 139 (MPA Tool) ; Orango 139 (MPA Tool).		Results by Jan 2011: Cacheu 107; Cantanhez 56; Cufada 75; Joao Vieira/Poilao 105; Orango 114. Also species populations rising in parks.
Date achieved	03/14/2005	03/14/2005		03/31/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Substantial achievement: (i) Cacheu 79% of target; Cantanhez 80%; Cufada 107%; Joao Vieira/Poilao 75.5%; Orango 82%; (ii) Manatee, Hippo, Elephant, Marine Turtle, Grey Parrot pops. increased in 3 Parks and Bijago Archipelago.			

(c) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Management effectiveness of five protected areas improved by end of project (Orango NP, Joao Vieira & Poilao NP, Cacheu NP, Cufada Lagoon Natural Park, and the new Cantanhez protected area.			

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Zero	IBAP and FIAL established		IBAP established and managing parks effectively; FIAL effectively financed 129 Community Micro-projects.
Date achieved	03/14/2005	03/14/2005		03/31/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved: (ii) IBAP managing 5 parks; park monitoring infrastructure/staff established. Management Tracking Tool scores increased to end-project. FIAL financed 129 Micro-projects: high satisfaction ratings; (ii) Species pops. increased. PDO/GEO Indic 1			
Indicator 2 :	Management effectiveness of three fishing reserves (Joao Vieira, Orango, Buba), improved by end-project.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Zero	NA	(i) RFZ established at Buba; (ii) Caravela Surveillance Post operational; (iii) National Fisheries Strategy approved with Act ion Plan.	Buba RFZ established; Caravela Station operational; National Fisheries Strategy approved.
Date achieved	03/14/2005	03/14/2005	09/18/2008	03/31/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved 100% of revised targets: Also, Fisheries Law and Artisanal Fisheries regulations approved 01/2010. Govt. contributi ng budget for RFZ surveillance.			
Indicator 3 :	75% of community development micro-projects funded by the Community Fund (FIAL) each year considered to have satisfactorily achieved their objectives.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Zero	75%		81.6% achieved by Year 6. Average of 5 surveys, 79.5%. Positive IRRs for FIAL microprojects.
Date achieved	03/14/2005	03/14/2005		03/31/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved/exceeded: Surveys of beneficiary satisfaction averaged 79.5%. (Note: This was also a KPI). Also IRRs for five micro projects ranged from 21.17% (lowland rice) to 50.13% (palm oil).			
Indicator 4 :	Sector policies, procedures and regulations required for EIAs prepared by end-Year 2.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Zero	End Year 2		Sector policies, procedures and regulations required for EIAs prepared by Year 6.
Date achieved	03/14/2005	03/14/2005		03/31/2011

Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved: EIA Law approved, promulgated and published 09/2010 enabling CAIA to charge fees/service; (ii) Sector Guidelines prepared/technically validated by Closing; (iii) CAIA now reviewing EIAs for 100% of development proposals.			
Indicator 5 :	Quality and timeliness of project implementation			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Zero	No target/benchmarks established		Project completed to Satisfactory standard with one-year extension of Closing Date.
Date achieved	03/14/2005	03/14/2005		03/31/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved: Ambitious project design but well-implemented within a reasonable time period and with focus on quality and sustainability.			

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

-						
No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	GEO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)	
					Project 1	Project 2
1	12/15/2004	S	S	S	0.00	0.00
2	04/16/2005	S	S	S	0.00	0.00
3	12/15/2005	S	S	S	0.65	0.36
4	06/21/2006	MS	MS	MS	0.82	0.89
5	12/22/2006	S	S	S	1.14	1.62
6	06/28/2007	S	S	S	1.40	2.43
7	08/30/2007	MS	MS	MS	1.57	2.60
8	04/12/2008	MS	MS	MS	2.05	3.82
9	11/26/2008	MS	MS	MS	2.23	4.80
10	05/26/2009	MS	MS	MS	2.34	4.80
11	12/18/2009	MU	MU	MU	2.93	4.80
12	05/23/2010	MU	MU	MU	3.19	4.80
13	03/29/2011	MS	MS	MS	3.21	4.80


H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)	Board Approved		ISR Ratings at Restructuring			Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions		Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
	PDO Change	GEO Change	DO	GEO	IP	Project1	Project 2	
12/21/2005	N		S		S	0.65		IDA: Cat. 1 Goods increased from SDR 350,000 to SDR 454,000, and reductions in Consultant Services and Unallocated Cats. Reas on: Certain activities not correctly evaluated in COSTAB and need to increase amount allocated to purchase of goods.
09/18/2008	N		MS		MS	2.20		IDA: (i) SDR 173,000 reallocated to Cats. Works, Incremental Operating Costs, and to Unallocated; (ii) Development Credit Agreement revised to give Govt. more flexibility in remaining project period; and (iii) Key Performance Indicator added: "75% of community development subprojects funded by FIAL each year considered to have satisfactorily achieved their objectives". Reason: Changes recommended by Mid-Term Review to achieve Key Performance Indicators.


09/18/2008				MS	MS		4.72	Reason: Changes recommended by MTR to achieve Key Performance Indicators. US\$237,000 reallocated to Cats. Goods, and to Consultant Services and Audit.
03/30/2010				MU	MU	3.12		Letter Agreement (IDA/EU Trust Fund) amended: (i) Closing Date of EU Trust Fund extended 12 months to 03/31/2011; and (ii) EU R 250,000 reallocated from Cat. 3 Micro-project Grants to Cat. 1 Goods, Cat. 2 Consultant Services, Audits and Training and Cat. 4 Incremental Operating Costs.

I. Disbursement Profile

P083453



P049513



1. Project Context, Development and Global Environment Objectives Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1.1.1 **Background:** Guinea-Bissau is an exceptionally poor country with low development indices. At appraisal, its estimated population was some 1.3 million and life expectancy about 43 years. Two-thirds of the country's population live below the poverty line and one-fifth live in extreme poverty. The development environment is challenging. Violent civil disturbances and government instability have taken their toll on all aspects of the economy and society. Civil war from 1998-1999 and a series of military coups created a "crisis containment" approach to social and economic development over the ensuing decade, depressing the development of promising sectors and national infrastructure, damaging institutions through high turnover in senior positions and an exodus of qualified public sector managers, enabling drug trafficking to gain traction, and miring a country with strong potential for growth and poverty reduction in a cycle of low performance and vulnerability.¹

1.1.2 The country's economy and future growth are highly dependent on its natural resource endowment which is rich, diverse and vulnerable, especially in the coastal zone where 80 per cent of the population lives. The country is endowed with good soils, favorable rainfall and significant mineral reserves. The economy is based primarily on farming and fishing; agriculture generates 80% of employment and 90% of exports. While most of the country's economic activity is concentrated in the coastal zone, it also hosts exceptional levels of biodiversity and pristine environments which could potentially drive greater economic growth in the region, including eco-tourism. A remarkable coastal landscape of terrestrial and aquatic environments is characterized by vast estuaries, seasonally flooded coastal plains and a large archipelago, among the richest in West Africa in terms of diversity, productivity and food potential. They are also considered the "nursery" for much of West Africa's fisheries, and are essential for the survival of several species which are globally-endangered or threatened, and for species which are economically important.

1.1.3 **Rationale for Bank/donor assistance:** Major sector issues of concern to Government and the Bank/international donor community at appraisal - and the primary rationale for the project - were four-fold: (i) Increasing population pressure on coastal and marine resources along with poverty and lack of economic alternatives were promoting biodiversity loss; (ii) Subsistence activities were causing deforestation and soil erosion; (iii) The capacity to sustainably manage fisheries was weak; and, (iv) Potential offshore petroleum exploration/extraction in coastal areas had serious environmental and social implications in the absence of safeguards.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

1.2.1 **Project Development Objective:** As stated in the PAD, the Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project (CBMP) sought "to build the capacity of Government agencies and natural resource users in Guinea-Bissau to collaboratively manage coastal environments and biodiversity for both conservation and sustainable development ends". However, the IDA Credit Agreement states the PDO as "to strengthen the Borrower's institutional framework and build human resource capacity to protect and sustainably manage its coastal and biological resources". The ICR has used the PAD version, in keeping with the ICR Guidelines, and with the team's usage of

¹ Assassination of the President and Army Chief of Staff in 2009 was followed by further violence and instability in early 2010. The PAD for the new Rural Community-Driven Development Project (Report # 49557-GW), citing the 2006/2007 World Bank Integrated Poverty and Social Assessment, states that GDP per capita in Guinea-Bissau would be around 43% higher today and about one in three persons in poverty today would not be, if the 1998-1999 conflict had not occurred.

that version in all major project documents (see 2.1.7 to 2.1.9 for a discussion of design issues affecting PDO, GEO and performance indicators).

1.2.2 The PAD shows the following Key Performance Indicators (KPI) supporting the PDO: (i) At least 3,500 sq. km of land and water under improved management as defined in the Project Implementation Plan (PIP), by end-project. Improved management would be measured using the World Wildlife Fund/World Bank Protected Areas Management Effectiveness Tool;² (ii) As of January 1, 2007, the number of infringements of the applicable regulatory framework related to the Reserved Fishing Zones by fishing vessels decreases by 10% per year in relation to the baseline established in calendar year 2006; (iii) As of January 1, 2007, the Government provides sufficient financial resources to cover the operational and maintenance costs of all fisheries surveillance activities (including surveillance stations, vessels and patrols); and, (iv) All public and private development projects eligible for review are submitted for environmental impact assessment review prior to being implemented.

1.3 Global Environment Objective and Key Indicators

1.3.1 As stated in the PAD, the GEO sought “to strengthen the conservation of globally significant ecosystems and species in Guinea-Bissau”. This was in line with the Global Environment Facility’s Operational Program 2. However, the GEF Grant Agreement describes project objectives as per the IDA Credit Agreement (see 1.2.1 above). As stated in the PAD, the primary outcome/impact indicator for the GEO, also to be measured by the Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (footnote 3), was: “Ecosystem health and function maintained or improved within Protected Areas, their buffer zones, the Biosphere Reserve and fishing reserves”. The GEF Grant Agreement does not cite this GEO indicator anywhere, but replicates in Schedule 5 the four PDO-linked Key Performance Indicators from the PAD (i.e. without the fifth indicator discussed in 1.4.1).

1.4 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

1.4.1 The PDO was not revised. The Credit Agreement was amended post-Mid-term Review (MTR) to add a fifth Key Performance Indicator linked to the Fund for Local Environmental Initiatives Fund (FIAL): “75% of FIAL micro-projects funded by the Community Fund (FIAL) each year are considered to have satisfactorily achieved their objectives”. Due to simple oversight, this KPI was not included in the original Credit Agreement or main text of the PAD although it appears in the PAD Project Design Summary (as an output indicator) and PAD Additional Annex 12 as an intended fifth KPI (see 2.2.3).

1.5 Revised GEO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

1.5.1 Neither the GEO nor its Key Indicator was revised.

² The tool is basic, simple and designed to measure management effectiveness over time, i.e. in line with Project goals for strengthening capacity. While management efficiency is a necessary but not always sufficient means for determining impact, the tool is widely recognized as a good, cost-effective proxy. The tool has been applied in over 85 countries primarily by donor agencies and NGOs, and is now mandatory for the World Bank, GEF and WWF. The methodology uses a rapid, site level assessment based on a score-card questionnaire which includes all six elements of management identified in the International Union for Conservation of Nature/World Commission on Protected Areas (IUCN/WCPA) Framework: context, planning, inputs, process, outputs and outcomes. It enables park managers and donors to identify needs, constraints and priority actions.

1.6 Main Beneficiaries

1.6.1 The PAD's depiction of the target population was broad, covering "affected local communities" as well as "other resource users, Government employees and decision-makers at all levels, local NGOs, and the small-scale private sector in the vicinity of protected areas or key habitats for targeted species". The socio-economic survey and census done as part of FIAL preparation established an eligible target population of 70,000 people already within the PAs and the 2 km outside radius (buffer zone) of each PA to remove the incentive for people to move into the PAs to benefit from FIAL. The project's environmental and social impact analysis (PAD, Additional Annex 15) describes the diverse ethnic composition, social organization and productive activities of likely beneficiaries of FIAL micro-project investments within the Parks.³

1.7 Original Components (as approved)

1.7.1 Project components were as follows (see Annex 2 for details):

Component 1: Protected Areas and Endangered Species Management (US\$3.73 million, 33.6% of total estimated cost) financed the strengthening of the institutional framework and management capacity for biodiversity and Protected Areas by establishing a financially and administratively autonomous entity, the Institute for Biodiversity and Protected Areas (IBAP) to manage the country's network of Protected Areas and endangered species.

Component 2: Natural Resources Management (US\$5.06 million, 45.5% of total estimated cost) promoted the sustainable use of biological resources at the local level through two sub-components: (a) a matching grant funding mechanism, the Fund for Local Environmental Initiatives (FIAL), financed by a European Union grant of US\$1.47 million (TF90557) to promote community-driven, sustainable use activities (micro-projects) inside and around targeted Protected Areas. This sub-component would also support creation of the private Bio-Guinea Foundation (FBG);⁴ and (b) capacity-building to strengthen the management, monitoring, control and surveillance of Reserved Fishing Zones (RFZ) and fisheries.⁵

Component 3: Environmental and Social Safeguards Framework (US\$0.63 million, 5.7% of total estimated cost) financed the establishment and implementation of an environmental safeguards framework supporting policies, procedures, and capacity-building to ensure the incorporation of environmental and social concerns into development decision-making. A new Unit for Environmental and Social Safeguards (CAIA) was intended to build national capacity to evaluate and monitor the environmental and social implications of development proposals.

Component 4: Project Management, and Monitoring and Evaluation (US\$1.69 million, 15.2% of total estimated cost) financed the daily management and tracking of project implementation, project financial management and procurement, the monitoring and evaluation of progress and impact, and facilitation of inter-agency relationships.

³ The PAD does not explain the identity of "other resource users". The Process Framework (PF) and Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) describe which populations might be affected by the project's implementation of Protected Area management plans; the Guinea-Bissau Fisheries Sector Strategy Paper (World Bank 2003) analyzes various stakeholders related to a range of fisheries issues facing the country; and, each of the five participating Protected Areas underwent a socio-economic analysis/survey and census to define *inter alia*, direct and indirect beneficiaries.

⁴ The FBG, intended to sustain IBAP/FIAL longer-term, would have two windows: a formalized FIAL financing mechanism; and, funding for IBAP's operational costs of managing the Protected Areas system.

⁵ The PAD defines a Reserved Fishing Zone as a fishing area located in the central part of a Marine Protected Area that is governed by special regulations approved by local communities. However, as the legal framework was developed by the Project, this definition was refined to attribute protected status to fisheries not previously covered.

1.8 Revised Components

1.8.1 As described in Section 2.2, the scope and budget of the RFZ/fisheries sub-component of Component 2 were scaled back following the Mid-term Review (MTR) to three concrete activities considered attainable by end-project: (i) a Reserved Fishing Zone established at Buba; (ii) an operational fisheries surveillance station constructed at Caravela; and (iii) a national fisheries strategy completed/approved by Government, with an action plan.

1.9 Other significant changes

1.9.1 Apart from the above, the following restructurings were effected:

(a) **December 21, 2005:** Certain project activities were underfunded, requiring a reallocation of IDA resources which increased Category 1 Goods by SDR 104,000 to SDR 454,000;⁶

(b) **September 18, 2008:** The GEF Grant Agreement was also revised in response to MTR recommendations designed to strengthen achievement of the KPI: US\$237,000 was reallocated to the Categories Goods, and Consultant Services and Audit.

(c) **September 19, 2008:** The MTR found that key project activities, e.g., fisheries under Component 2 were under-funded from the outset and likely to affect the achievement of Key Performance Indicators: (i) SDR 173,000 were reallocated to IDA Categories Works, Operating Costs and Unallocated; (ii) the Development Credit Agreement was revised to give Government more flexibility in the remaining project period; and (iii) a KPI was added to reflect achievements by FIAL: “75% of community development micro-projects funded by FIAL each year are considered to have satisfactorily achieved their objectives” (see 1.4.1 and 2.2.3)

(c) **March 30, 2010:** The Letter Agreement (EU Trust Fund TF 090557-GUB) was amended, extending the closing date by 12 months to end-March 2011, and reallocating EUR 250,000 from Cat. 3, Micro-project Grants to Cat. 1 Goods, Cat. 2, Consultant Services, Audits and Training, and Cat. 4, Incremental Operating Costs. The extension permitted (i) completion of EU-funded FIAL activities (delayed by 2.5 years), and full disbursement of the EU Trust Fund; and, (ii) negotiation, establishment and initial capitalization of the FBG.

(e) **April 26, 2010:** The IDA Credit Agreement was amended extending the Closing Date one year to 03/31/2011, and reallocating SDR 240,881 to Category 2 Works, Consultant Services and Audits, and Incremental Operating Costs, to permit: (i) creation of the Bio-Guinea Foundation; (ii) approval of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Law; and (iii) completion of key activities. The additional time also permitted Government to address actual/potential impacts on Cufada Park and Buba RFZ under the agreed Action Plan. Extension and reallocation were conditional on Borrower acceptance of the Cufada Action Plan (see Section 2).

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

2.1.1 The determination of the institutional environment under challenging circumstances:

During project preparation, the Bank used a participatory approach of multi-stakeholder consultations (involving the European Union, UNDP, IUCN, the MAVA Foundation, academia, national entities and local community representatives), to clarify stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities, and provided continuous technical assistance to stakeholders. However,

⁶ IDA/GEF cost-sharing of certain activities (70%/30% respectively as set up in the original COSTAB budgets), was causing problems for financial management. The reallocation (supported by re-formulation of budgets) defined which expenses would be paid 100% by IDA and 100% by GEF.

preparatory work was severely challenged by country circumstances. At the time of project identification, country stakeholder knowledge and/or ownership of coastal zone/protected areas management was limited. A certain degree of momentum had been created by the work over the previous decade of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), who along with various NGOs and the Swiss Government, essentially intervened in the field of natural resources management on behalf of the government. The Bank team built on these modest beginnings with extensive and thorough background analysis in the course of project identification and preparation. Unfortunately, the 1998-1999 internal conflict interrupted the first Bank identification mission and led to a suspension of the preparation of new operations. Work was resumed only in 2000 with a new government in place, the country in economic and political disarray and still facing frequent incidents of political violence.

2.1.2 The main challenge in this situation was to build an institutional foundation for the implementation of project activities in a politicized environment where technical considerations were hard to sell, and awareness of the conflict of interest between the protection of natural resources and their exploitation was limited. Institutional studies, commissioned by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) recommended the creation of a Ministry of Environment to replace the Directorate General of Environment (*Direção Geral do Ambiente* - DGA) under the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources with limited capacity (although this did not materialize, at the end). These studies, together with World Bank Economic and Sector Work, also laid the foundation for core project design features, including the creation of: (i) the semi-autonomous Institute for Biodiversity and Protected Areas (IBAP), (ii) the Environmental and Social Safeguards Unit (CAIA); and (iii) the Guinea-Bissau Foundation (FBG). In terms of management of protected areas, an administratively and financially autonomous institution such as IBAP was considered preferable to a labor-sharing arrangement between external organizations and the DGA, or the establishment of a Coordination Council for Protected Areas to be embedded in a line ministry.

2.1.3 In terms of medium- to long-term funding options for IBAP, the creation of an off-shore conservation trust fund, the FBG, catalyzing private sector and donor participation was preferred to either relying on national budget allocations to support IBAP, or on unpredictable external donor financing to supplement national budget resources. The establishment of CAIA under the Prime Minister's Office was seen as a better option compared to the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) primarily to avoid any conflict of interest, as the MENR was responsible for supervising the exploitation of extractive industry, as well as environmental considerations, and second, due of the weight and authority of the Prime Minister's office. Responsibility for project implementation was assumed under the neutral Ministry of Finance.

2.1.4 **Evolution of the project rationale:** Given country conditions, the Bank opted for a lower risk, conservative strategy promoting efficient alternatives to existing resource use, small-scale experimentation and participatory local initiatives. Despite limited human resources, and due to the potential development of offshore petroleum and increase in industrial fishing, project scope was expanded to establish environmental and social safeguards, administered through CAIA and integrated into national decision-making.

2.1.5 **Lessons reflected in project design:** Project design was influenced by lessons learned from broad experience in Guinea-Bissau and elsewhere by Bank, GEF and IUCN since the early 1990s related to sustainable conservation financing. These lessons highlighted the importance of taking the following into consideration: (i) sustained effort over an extended period to develop in-country capacity and stimulate local support, building a fruitful dialogue with communities and demonstrating tangible field activities in protected areas - reflected in the project's FIAL

component - not focusing exclusively on biodiversity conservation; (ii) addressing institutional issues – through focal point entities such as IBAP - and using a strategic approach blending conservation planning with poverty reduction efforts, to promote long-term sustainability; (iii) ensuring government ownership of coastal and biodiversity management efforts to reduce vulnerability to reversal, by fostering institutional and regulatory structures, capacity-building and a sustainable financing mechanism; and (iv) ensuring financial sustainability, especially stable recurrent cost financing for Protected Areas and endangered species management and monitoring, through the creation of suitable mechanisms, e.g. a foundation. However, even though Project design was ostensibly based on a careful assessment of human and institutional capacity constraints, the complexity and sophistication of project design and key indicators in the country context were notable – more a reaction to internal Bank incentives and Guinea-Bissau’s multiple needs than a reflection of in-country capacity or the likely pace of on-the-job learning (see 2.1.6)

Assessment of project design:

2.1.6 Components and organization: The Project’s main institutions, closely linked to its main lines of activity/components in conceptual and operational terms were as follows: (i) IBAP (Component 1) consolidated PA management within one specialized institution outside the line ministries, reactivated the creation of new Protected Areas, and ensured the sustainable financing of the parks management system and its activities. IBAP’s relative independence was expected to garner external financing for the Parks, otherwise unavailable through the public sector budget; (ii) The Fund for Local Environmental Initiatives (FIAL) (Component 2) complemented IBAP’s conservation activities by guiding Park development/conservation through its micro-project investment and community-organization role within the Parks. Government never contemplated ring-fencing the parks and removing populations. FIAL would also channel resources longer-term into the development priorities of rural communities nation-wide; (iii) The Environmental and Social Safeguards Unit (CAIA) (Component 3) would provide mandatory review of all public and private development projects, support long-term conservation of parks/protected areas operated by IBAP and set environmental standards for FIAL’s investment activities and socio-economic goals. CAIA’s role was to mitigate potential, large external shocks to the Parks (e.g., petroleum exploration and mining) and introduce environmentally and socially sustainable development nation-wide.⁷

2.1.7 Fisheries sub-component: Activities related to this sub-component were added at management’s request to the “pillars” of IBAP, FIAL and CAIA quite late in the process and lacked stakeholder buy-in. The two KPIs were relevant *per se* but not essential to achieving project objectives, their design was unlikely to capture the wealth of fisheries outcomes, their schedule was unrealistic, and they expanded project scope, difficulty and cost (although they did come with additional IDA resources). That said, and with the benefit of hindsight, the fisheries elements were critically important and by end-project they had registered many successes.⁸ They were well-grounded in the Guinea-Bissau Fisheries Economic and Sector Work (ESW) and the Bank Fisheries Strategy Note and were designed to use the CBMP as the vehicle for ensuring a seat at the table in the emerging fisheries dialogue leading to the larger, more specialized fisheries operation (approved in March 2011).⁹

⁷ The Project was characterized at appraisal as essentially institution-building: establishing and consolidating new institutions, supporting legislative frameworks, and building capacity to manage the Parks.

⁸ The sub-component was designed to develop and test a new practice for managing fisheries in Reserved Fishing Zones, i.e., zones located in the central portion of marine protected areas that are governed by special regulations approved by local communities.

⁹ West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (Guinea-Bissau), APL of US\$6.0 IDA and US\$2.0 m GEF. Project design builds directly off the National Fisheries Strategy developed by the CBMP.

2.1.8 Quality at entry: Viewed overall, project quality at entry was affected by the desire of both the Bank and Government to include as much substantive activity as possible given the IDA-based performance allocation framework. There was little immediate prospect for another natural resources management/environmental project and there were many priorities. Last minute inclusion of the fisheries activities was symptomatic of this concern. Quality also suffered because of under-estimation of the Project's overall funding needs. While events such as US Dollar devaluation - mainly in 2007 and 2008 - and rising fuel costs pushed up funding requirements during implementation and could not have been foreseen, the budgetary implications of the rural/outdoors nature of many project activities were inadequately accounted for in project design and rapidly became a constraint.¹⁰

2.1.9 Project development objectives (PDO), Global environmental objective (GEO) and indicators: The PDO addressed country needs but was ambitious for country circumstances and for one project. The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) were linked to individual components rather than the main elements of the PDO and in several cases were technically, legally and/or operationally difficult to achieve and not easily measured. Interpretation of the first KPI hinged on an operational determination of "improved management", which would be judged by applying the Protected Area Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (see 1.2.2). Fisheries, a sub-component of just US\$1.6 million intended to test certain approaches, was assigned two of the four KPIs and the most difficult. Through an oversight, FIAL activities had no KPI (see 1.4.1).

2.1.10 The GEO was consistent with GEF goals and operational strategies but, as commonly occurs with GEF projects, was stated in overly-sweeping and ambitious terms for the corresponding results to be effectively measurable or even observable at the time of project completion. It also did not include a sustainable development goal, although this was typical of GEOs of the period. Also, the extent to which the Tracking Tool alone could adequately measure "strengthened conservation of ecosystems and species" or the equally broad (and only) linked KPI, "eco-system health and function maintained or improved within Protected Areas, their buffer zones, the Biosphere Reserve and fishing reserves" was questionable.

2.1.11 Institutional arrangements: The Ministry of Finance and Economy took the lead in partnership with the Ministries of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministry of Fisheries and the Office of the Prime Minister. Even so, the project's institutional set-up was designed to minimize Government's direct responsibility and to weather conflict and Government transitions; in practice, 90% of project implementation rested with the Project Management Unit (PMU) and sector focal points IBAP, FIAL and CAIA. Institutional functions/structures were organized into three types: those providing guidance and monitoring; executive bodies; and bodies for supervision and accountability. These arrangements were quite complex but they worked well. The goal was: (i) to ensure that project implementation was inclusive, participatory, responded to massive institutional weaknesses through network building and organizational structures responding to every contingency/need, and avoided institutional turf wars; and, (ii) to build a framework, potentially sustainable over the long-term, within an otherwise poorly-functioning institutional and organizational landscape. Financial Management and Procurement staff and functions were under the oversight (i.e., supervision and training) of more experienced fiduciary staff in the PMU for the Private Sector Rehabilitation and Development Project, while the Project's own PMU would coordinate project monitoring and evaluation.

¹⁰ While COSTAB calculations were done at appraisal it remains unclear whether the unit costs were current. Unit cost data came from the client, building on similar work carried out in the earlier years of project preparation.

Adequacy of Government's commitment:

2.1.12 Discussion of Government commitment must factor in the undermining effects of the unstable national context, set against the Bank's painstaking efforts to build Government's positive perception of project objectives. Government had already prepared a National Environmental Action Plan (UNDP/UNSO 2004), a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (UNDP/GEF 2004), and was at appraisal, working on a National Capacity Self-Assessment for Global Environment Management (GEF-funded). Government's main (donor-supported) achievements in the previous decade included: establishing the Bolama-Bijagos Biosphere Reserve (1996); the Framework Law on Protected Areas (1997); the embryonic Protected Area network (largely on paper and managed by several entities until the Project institutionalized/unified its management);¹¹ a Coastal Planning Unit (GPC); partnering with national NGOs in financing conservationist community micro-projects; and, environmental awareness-building. There was an active dialogue ongoing, led by the Government, involving all key stakeholders with respect to restructuring and strengthening the existing institutional framework governing environment and biodiversity, and the project built upon this engagement. That said however, the Ministry of Fisheries' commitment to the fisheries framework was weak and the PAD acknowledged that greater political will was needed. Overall, Government's commitment was moderately satisfactory.

Risk assessment:

2.1.13 The PAD correctly identified important risks associated with project implementation, although the disruptive effects of civil/military violence were not mentioned. The level of political, institutional and organizational capacity implied by the risk mitigation measures themselves was less realistic, and a significant risk – project complexity – was omitted. Procurement risk was also not mentioned – in fact the PAD indicates that “there should be no major procurement problems” – but turned out to be substantial.¹² Also risky was the project's expectation that its executors – PMU, IBAP, FIAL and CAIA – could adhere to demanding timetables and pressure to deliver while simultaneously trying to build capacity through on-the-job learning. While noting the ambitious nature of the project's technically innovative approach, the PAD described it as “appropriate under the country's circumstances, particularly in the context of extremely weak government capacity, the limited pool of experienced and skilled people and the lack of sound information”. It could equally be argued that the Project took advantage of its one chance to construct the institutions and tools needed to address pressing priorities longer-term, and hindsight shows how the Project's dominant activity streams launched a series of important new, scaled-up operations. With these considerations in mind, the overall risk assessment is rated as moderately satisfactory.

2.2 Implementation**Factors affecting project implementation:**

2.2.1 **Inadequate resources:** The Project was under-budgeted relative to real costs, forcing drastic economies and curtailing certain activities; some 85% of the operational budget was spent

¹¹ Orango, João Vieira and Poilão, and Cacheu National Parks. Cufada and subsequently, Cantanhez and Urok were integrated with these under the Project.

¹² The country lacked procurement expertise and familiarity with Bank procurement guidelines/procedures, and innovative activities such as the community-driven development (CDD) micro-projects within the Protected Areas posed procurement issues. Bank procurement guidelines for CDD projects had not yet been developed at the time of project appraisal.

with three years still remaining. The logistical costs of monitoring and surveillance of Protected Areas covering some 5,400 km² and extensive fishing zones within a massive archipelago were not fully-grasped. Cost data used for appraisal COSTAB calculations (obtained from the client) may not have been current. Magnifying this situation were the negative effects of US Dollar devaluation (especially on GEF activities), rapid price escalation for the fuel and lubricants needed for surveillance vehicles/logistics, and lack of electricity in Bissau requiring the constant use of expensive generators.¹³ Actions taken post-MTR included reducing certain activities, reallocating funds and finding specific cost savings. Partnerships with other donors (e.g., the International Foundation of Bank d'Arguin (FIBA), UNDP and others) leveraged additional funding (see 2.3.4). IDA funding was reallocated to finance the FIAL pilot micro-projects because exacerbating the Project's funding woes, EU trust funds earmarked for FIAL community investment activities were delayed some 2.5 years (see below).

2.2.2 Delayed delivery of European Union Trust Funds: The EU was expected to co-finance US\$1.59 million of the US\$2.64 million total costs of the FIAL CDD activities but by end-2005 had only a preliminary proposal available.¹⁴ To maintain momentum, IDA/GEF funds were reallocated to finance the start-up costs of FIAL activities including seven pilot micro-projects to test the FIAL approach/methodology and establish a presence in the Parks while the Bank negotiated with the EU over the terms of its participation/collaboration. The need to harmonize procedures and processes was especially challenging. The Bank and EU finally agreed on a common budget and institutional arrangements for the FIAL component, and Bank management of the EU funds. The EU proposal was revised in June 2006 but the funds took another year to arrive and even then, flowed slowly due to their disbursement in three installments. A one year extension of the EU Trust Fund closing date was needed to permit their full disbursement.

2.2.3 Procurement: Inadequate procurement capacity and performance slowed the pace of project execution and disbursement (see 2.2).¹⁵ Procurement personnel showed low capacity to process procurement packages to Bank standards, especially for the contracting of consultants, delaying many crucial activities. Procurement, together with FM, was mentored by the Private Sector Project PMU, however this was not an effective arrangement, in part because communication with the CBMP PMU was deficient until a protocol of collaboration was developed. Further, the project procurement specialist showed considerable skills and knowledge gaps, with few options for replacement. For some time, the CMU had contemplated a portfolio-wide solution to procurement by creating a procurement hub but despite much discussion this idea never materialized. The Bank/PMU opted to retain and invest in training the individual, whose untimely departure in 2010 saw procurement assumed by designated staff from IBAP in the interim. A consultant was hired in the final months of project implementation to consolidate the archives but (as first noted by the 2009 audit report), some files remained incomplete due to missing documents. The end-project procurement rating remained Moderately Unsatisfactory.

¹³ The purchase, operation and maintenance of generators were costly. By 2007, fuel costs had increased 230%, the US Dollar had lost about one-third of its value in relation to the national currency, and some 30% of GEF resources were no longer available to the Project.

¹⁴ The IDA/GEF appraisal design for the FIAL activities was based on an understanding that the EU funds would be fully-integrated, using all the same processes/procedures, but the EU preferred a parallel system, duplicating costs and requiring the project team to use two entirely different FM/procurement approaches and a separate implementing unit. The implication was a complete re-design of the IDA/GEF project unless an understanding could be reached.

¹⁵ The Quality of Supervision Assessment (QSA 7) noted that the Project Team felt another six months of preparation time before project initiation would have been desirable to address procurement capacity issues.

2.2.4 Political and military instability: Repeated, violent political and military events following Effectiveness and throughout implementation created an unstable context for project execution and sustainability. Despite these difficulties and because of the experience and stability of the Bank and core counterpart teams – and the resilience of the Guinea-Bissauan people - project implementation managed to stay on track.¹⁶ But the inevitable outcome of these upheavals included: (i) turnover at the Ministerial level requiring constant reinforcement of the project message and objectives at senior levels of Government; (ii) profound effects on national growth and functionality including budget - catching in their wake project institutions such as IBAP and FIAL, and fisheries surveillance activities dependent on regular budget allocations; and (iii) suspension by the EU of any significant budget support following the violent events of 2010. The events/activities affecting the environmental integrity of the Cufada National Park in 2009 (see 2.2.6) may be attributed in part to ministerial turnover and new authorities in place with little knowledge of the national transitional environmental and social safeguards framework/requirements.

2.2.5 Operations in the Parks: Protected Area development and management systems have implicit scientific and technical goals in addition to their basic surveillance activities. These elements require adequate staffing and logistical endowments, and strategically-located support systems for extensive field work. Acknowledging that the Protected Area network is a work in progress, under the CBMP, there was no intermediate level scientific officer or technical specialist between the Park Director and rangers. The Park Director was obliged, with support from the species specialist and operations officer based at IBAP headquarters, to assume the burden of administration, conservation aspects and biodiversity monitoring. Also, considering the size of the official area protected and magnitude of the challenges, the Parks needed more staff; park rangers/guards out of their home territory needed basic, overnight infrastructure; the quality and availability of vehicles was inadequate for long distances in un-developed areas with poor roads; and, staff rotation was not adopted for lack of qualified personnel. These issues were recognized during project implementation but resource constraints delayed their resolution during the life of the Project.

2.2.6 Cufada National Park: Transitional national safeguards laws/policies were breached by mining-related activities in the Cufada National Park which became a major test of the country's emerging safeguards policy/capacity. A Bank mission in 2009 discovered that Bauxite Angola, through a subcontractor, had started construction of a deep-water port and road within the boundaries of the Cufada National Park near Buba without the knowledge of or submission of an environmental impact assessment (EIA) to CAIA. The port and road were intended to support a future bauxite mine in the Boé region, outside the Park. It is important to note that the Project financed the Park but not the mining-related road or port; this was an outside intervention beyond the Project's control (this occurrence was in a very small portion of the Park). Further, the final adoption of the EIA law did not occur until 2010; before then, CAIA was created and operating under temporary legislation. However, the direct and indirect damages resulting from these works threatened project achievements since 2005 in terms of establishing national environmental and social safeguards processes, the integrity of the affected Park and of the Buba Reserved Fishing

¹⁶ Violent events in 2010 caused the evacuation of Bank mission members.

Zone.¹⁷ These actions also contravened the Credit and Grant Agreements, and implied a reputational risk for the Bank and GEF.¹⁸

2.2.7 The Bank, working with IBAP and CAIA, contracted an international specialist to diagnose the physical, technical and financial aspects following which counterpart teams agreed with Government on an Action Plan to address the existing and potential impacts of the planned deep water port and road on the Park.¹⁹ Satisfactory implementation of the Action Plan was designed to restore project compliance with financing agreements and upgrade the project rating from Moderately Unsatisfactory. At closing, Government was in compliance with and on track to complete, all required steps under the Plan, and was keeping the Bank informed. In February 2011, a preliminary EIA was received by the Government from Bauxite Angola and shared with the Bank for informal technical review. The draft EIA is the basis for the full Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP). Government has consistently and repeatedly, in writing, reiterated its commitment to the Action Plan, to ensuring that the environmental and social impacts are mitigated, and that the full ESIA and ESMP for the planned port and road will be shared with the Bank upon receipt; and, that the submission and approval of the ESMP is a fundamental condition for Bauxite Angola to re-start any works associated with the mine (the firm stalled all works due to the 2010 civil unrest).²⁰ The Bank Team, advised by LEGEN (Environmental and Social Safeguards), remains in regular dialogue with Government to ensure the implementation of remaining steps under the Action Plan, even beyond project closure.

2.2.8 **Mid-term Review:** The high quality Mid-term Review (MTR) of March 2008 - a joint mission of the Bank, EU and IUCN - was influential in defining and resolving key issues affecting project execution. The MTR concluded that the Project - with some caveats - was on track to meet most of its objectives and rated it Moderately Satisfactory. Tangible, positive results were being achieved, albeit slowly, by IBAP and by the pilot phase of the FIAL. CAIA was also making good progress although its expanding workload implied the need to upgrade capacity. The fisheries sub-component however, was struggling, hampered by complexity, lack of budget and Government ownership, and deficient communication between the Project and the Ministry of Fisheries. Procurement difficulties affected key fisheries works and other aspects of the Project.

2.2.9 The mission determined that the project was overly ambitious and under-budgeted from the outset, i.e., there were design and Quality at Entry problems, resulting in resource shortages for its remaining activities/period exacerbated by US Dollar depreciation and increasing fuel and

¹⁷ A further concern post-mission related to the integrity of and potential damage to Cacheu National Park, affected by the possible upstream impacts of phosphate mine development by GM Phosphate Mining Ltd. near the town of Farim. Subsequently, two preliminary EIAs were submitted and a final EIA in 2010.

¹⁸ The Bank was informed by the Parks and Protected Areas Agency that Government had entered into a consortium with the Government of Angola and private companies to develop the Bauxite mine at Boe; construction plans were already started for the road linking the mine to a deep-water port to be built at Buba. This was likely to destroy one of the five Parks financed by the Project as well as its valuable wildlife, and the Buba RFZ. CAIA, although established and located in the Prime Minister's Office, was not informed.

¹⁹ Cufada Park Action Plan: (i) Suspension of Works Orders by the Office of the Prime Minister on December 28, 2009, and by the Secretary of State for Transport and Telecommunications on February 12, 2010, will continue to be upheld pending completion of the EIA process satisfactory to CAIA; (ii) an environmental assessment, including an environmental management plan of a quality and process satisfactory to CAIA, will be completed for the proposed port and road development affecting Cufada and the Buba Reserved Fishing Zone; and (iii) the World Bank will be provided an opportunity, in a timely manner, to review and comment on said environmental assessment prior to its finalization. Note: Before the Action Plan was agreed, the works had already stalled and the Angolan team had left Guinea-Bissau due to the political instability.

²⁰ Letter dated March 16, 2011 from Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior. A previous letter of August 20, 2009 acknowledges the important role of IBAP and CAIA, and raises the issue of Bauxite Angola paying compensation for defined damages to the Park and potentially affected populations.

operating costs. The MTR recommended a “light” restructuring to streamline the Project and ensure the achievement of most objectives and targets by closing. The KPIs were not restructured. Recommendations and actions taken post-MTR were as follows:

(a) **Key Performance Indicator was added:** The MTR concluded that the Project KPI were far-reaching and in some cases did not fully reflect project activities or objectives. FIAL activities had no KPI while two ambitious and unrealistic KPI were linked to the modestly-funded Fisheries Sub-component which was not at that time on track to meet them. However, the time needed for Board approval of KPI changes deterred the Team from this option. Bank management was briefed and concurred with this decision. A FIAL KPI (1.4.1) was added by amending the Credit Agreement, and the fisheries KPIs were retained as is.²¹

(b) **Scope of fisheries activities was reduced:** The Fisheries Sub-component was reduced to three concrete and attainable outputs by end-project: (i) a Reserve Fishing Zone established at Buba; (ii) an operational fisheries surveillance base constructed at Caravela; and (iii) a national fisheries strategy completed by Government with an Action Plan for its implementation.

(c) **Project budget was revised and maximum effort was focused on future sustainability:** The project budget for the remaining two years was revised to reflect streamlined activities, the smaller fisheries sub-component and reduced operational costs. Further, actions were intensified to ensure that the planned, financially viable Bio-Guinea Foundation (FBG) was established with a preliminary endowment to fund the Protected Areas network (see 4.1.1(a)).

2.2.10 Partnerships: Cost containment represented both a threat to and a discipline on, all project activities but especially on human resource quality and deployment (financed under Component 4 and with the smallest resource allocation). The Project astutely tapped into diverse partnerships for support. The Bank financed all the non-headline/core activities that made IBAP function, while acting as the primary catalyst for securing additional funding from donors. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) conducted/co-financed training in strategic environmental evaluation, supported national participation in such training in Senegal and Gambia, and trained the CAIA coordinator in social and environmental monitoring. The Government of Spain, International Foundation of Bank d’Arguin (FIBA) and the National Park Service of Spain provided sustained financial support for the Bijagós Archipelago and Orango Park. The West African Development Bank (BOAD) co-trained members of the environmental evaluation unit of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). Reserved Fishing Zone surveillance vessels were financed by the Government of Turkey. Finally, various entities/donors supported CAIA, the National Conference on Extractive Industries and Sustainable Development and its post-conference dissemination sessions, while UNDP, IUCN and others contributed fuel for project activities.

2.2.11 Project at Risk Status: The Project was declared at risk mainly due to country environment and country record (outside of the control of the project). The Project was declared a problem project only for a short period, from December 2009 to March 2011 (two ISR cycles) due to the fact that the supervision ratings for Implementation Progress (IP), Development Objectives (DO) and GEO were Moderately Unsatisfactory, but they were restored to MS. The

²¹ The implication of not processing a First Order restructuring of the fisheries KPI meant *inter alia*, that at closing, the reduced fisheries activities would still need to be measured against original targets. Management pointed out these implications to the Team in a late 2009 ISR, suggesting the team may want to do “further restructuring”, but the effort involved in even the light restructuring, and limited time remaining, deterred any repeat effort. The Project Team stands by its decisions in this regard, and notes that final results for fisheries activities were impressive and extended well beyond the more limited horizon envisaged at the time of the MTR. See 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 and Annex 2.

primary reason for downgrading DO in 2009 was the breach of Protected Areas law in the Cufada National Park following which an Action Plan agreed with Government needed to be implemented and tracked over time (see 2.2.6-2.2.7). Satisfactory progress by closing saw DO upgraded to MS (see 3.2.1).

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

2.3.1 Design: Monitoring and evaluation capacity and management information systems (MIS) development were a strong focus in project design and followed Bank best practice. Development of the M&E Plan and the Log Frame was participatory and included workshops with diverse stakeholder participation, but completion of the M&E Plan took an inordinately long time. Even so, project supervision reports consistently demonstrate the attention given to developing M&E skills and systems. The PAD included an M&E capacity-building plan including identification of key stakeholders/users, their needs, and training goals. The MIS was to cover procurement, output indicator data, and impact indicators. Each of the three major institutions (IBAP, CAIA and FIAL) was to conduct its own evaluation activities.

2.3.2 Implementation and utilization: The ICR rates M&E as Satisfactory, based on the following: (i) the MIS was established and operated relatively well, increasing its capacity and efficiency over time in response to Bank mentoring/training and growing in-house experience. Data produced by the system supported all key project reporting functions including Financial Management, Procurement, impact evaluations and the ICR; (ii) products of evaluation activities included three evaluation reports (FIAL micro-projects), the final Borrower Completion Report (PMU, 2011), periodic progress monitoring and evaluation reports, legislative proposals, strategy papers and communications-related documents/products. IBAP also produced a substantial body of analytical and descriptive publications/documents. The products of project evaluation and data collection/storage were also used extensively for the new CDD, fisheries and other projects. (See 2.5.3 and Annex 9).

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

2.4.1 Safeguards: The Project triggered OP/BP 3.12 Involuntary Resettlement given the possibility that park management activities might prompt the transfer of populations, and a Resettlement Policy Framework was prepared. No resettlement occurred and the policy framework was not invoked. CAIA's authority to review EIAs for all proposed development projects was institutionalized, while FIAL sought to motivate communities' conservation ethic and behavior through small-scale, selective CDD investments in the Parks using innovative technology and conservation messages. These institutional instruments and practices on the ground successfully aligned the Project with the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) prepared at appraisal. The Project also triggered 4.04 (Natural Habitats) and 11.03 (Cultural Property); the Project's Park management goals and activities explicitly and successfully targeted the conservation of natural habitats, while cultural property considerations did not arise.

2.4.2 Financial Management and Audit: The Financial Management function was well-conducted. The FM Specialist in the PMU showed excellent performance, learning rapidly and benefiting from initial guidance received from the Private Sector Project PMU and from the Bank's FM Specialists. The PMU FM team has well-established systems, good reporting and archiving capacity/performance, and an efficient and ethical approach. FM ratings were generally satisfactory but were downgraded to Moderately Satisfactory (with Moderate risk) in the final year when the computer supporting the accounting information system crashed and all project transactions accounted in the system were lost without adequate back-up provisions. Project

transactions continued to be registered in Excel. An updated accounting system was installed prior to Project closing.

2.4.3 Project audits were mostly clean and unqualified with prompt follow-up of Bank recommendations. The final MS rating took into account late delivery of the 2009 audit report and auditors not certifying the financial statements due to some ineligible expenses and other issues.²² An action plan was prepared to correct these issues and at closing was 95% executed. The 2010/11 audit exercise will monitor final actions under this plan.

2.4.4 **Procurement:** As discussed in Section 2.2, procurement performance was weak, had negative effects on project execution throughout and with some exceptions, was rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. The Bank and PMU teams grappled continuously with procurement issues. Key project activities were delayed, the quality and sustainability of goods purchased was affected by misinterpretation of Bank procurement rules, the mentoring arrangement with the Private Sector Project did not work well due to tensions between the respective project PMUs, and finding competent local procurement personnel was a binding constraint. The Bank Team identified the main issues early on and provided timely and appropriate responses. However, as noted earlier, the Bank/PMU chose to invest in training the insufficiently qualified incumbent rather than push Government for his dismissal earlier on, but this proved unsuccessful and the incumbent suddenly left. The PMU rapidly contracted an international procurement specialist to restore order, while designated IBAP staff assumed the day-to-day procurement function until a replacement was recruited for the new, approved Bank projects (see 2.5.3). Consolidation of procurement archives in the final months could only go so far as certain files remained incomplete at closing due to missing documents.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

2.5.1 **Transition arrangements and sustaining institutional reforms/capacity:** Most FIAL micro-projects have been formally handed over for the operation and maintenance stage to the respective communities, trained to assume this role. Transitional arrangements for IBAP and FIAL are linked to leveraging interim resources in the short-term and to the establishment and capitalization of the FBG, the status of which is described elsewhere in this report. By end-project, CAIA had acquired the legal authority to charge fees for its services and the details and structure of this process were being finalized. Also, working through the *Pontos Focais* and *Antenas Setoriais* (legal extensions of CAIA's mandate located within key public ministries/agencies to ensure integration of national safeguards policies and the environmental agenda into national development), CAIA has the capillarity and institutional weight to sustain its role and responsibilities. Fisheries activities, monitoring and surveillance are dependent on regular, recurrent budget allocations and although a satisfactory allocation was initiated in the final year of the project, the longer-term quantity and regularity of such allocations cannot be predicted.

²² Up to 2009, all audits were timely and unqualified, conducted by Bank-approved audit firms. Based on the Bank's requirement that the audit firm must change every two years, steps were taken to contract a new audit firm but delays occurred due to the departure of the PMU procurement specialist. Bidding was re-launched but contracting was delayed and only one firm bid for the job. Under instructions from the Bank's Dakar office the TOR was changed resulting in an audit process quite different from previous years/firms. The PMU lacked adequate time to prepare its work for the audit based on the new TOR which also entailed project staff doing part of the work previously done by the auditors. Auditors requested accounts going back to the beginning of the project - in Africa Financial Community Francs (FCFA) - with all supporting documents. Project staff was severely over-burdened and their efforts suffered from the precipitous departure of the PMU procurement specialist along with key supporting dossiers needed for auditors. The auditors remained firm in these new requirements/procedures, issuing a Qualified audit opinion with an action plan. All issues raised by the auditors were resolved in a satisfactory manner by project closing.

2.5.2 O&M arrangements: Communities were trained to operate and maintain their investments in an organized, collective way. In a comparatively unusual and innovative move, even after formal completion, the Permanent Technical Secretariat (STP), Local Operational Partners (POL) and Park staff remained involved, monitoring operation of the respective community micro-project, and working with maintenance committees to ensure that they started off on a sustainable footing (see Annex 2). Building such capacity takes time. It was felt that departing abruptly from a micro-project was inappropriate. A committee's readiness to stand on its own feet means support is gradually phased out. The FIAL impact evaluations called attention to this important principle, which was adopted. The benefits of water supply provide, in themselves, sufficient incentive to maintain the service. Wells observed in the field appeared clean, protected from incursion and in working order. Similarly, school buildings were well-maintained and classes organized, while horticulture micro-projects were in full working order with high beneficiary satisfaction ratings.

2.5.3 Follow-up operations: Project experiences and lessons have directly influenced new operations, designed *inter alia*, to support, scale up and sustain CBMP outcomes:

(a) **Rural, Community-Driven Development Project** (IDA SRD 3.3 million) - and its "sister" operation, the **Participatory Rural Development Project** (State and Peace-building Fund (SPF), US\$5.0 million) - are managed jointly and based on the successful FIAL micro-credit investment model. These projects seek to alleviate rural poverty and improve living conditions based on four "pillars": strengthened governance; better access to basic socio-economic infrastructure and services; economic growth and job creation; and, improving the living conditions of vulnerable groups;

(b) **West Africa Regional Fisheries Program** (Guinea-Bissau, IDA US\$6.0 million and GEF US\$2.0 million) approved on March 31, 2011 and awaiting effectiveness, would strengthen the country's capacity to govern and manage targeted fisheries, reduce illegal fishing and increase the local value added to fish products. The project would benefit the entire population through governance reforms ensuring that the sector contributes sustainably to economic growth. Project design heeds the lessons of global best practice as well as specific lessons from the CBMP including limiting the operational costs of fisheries surveillance for post-project sustainability;

(c) **Biodiversity Conservation Trust Fund (BCTF)** (GEF medium-sized project of US\$950,000), became effective March 14, 2011 and will: (i) strengthen the ongoing management and conservation of the recipient's selected National Parks; and (ii) pilot a sustainable financing mechanism (the BGF) for such parks;

(d) **IDA Biodiversity Conservation Project** (SDR 1.3 million), effective June 21, 2011, will: (i) strengthen IBAP's management of the National Parks; and (ii) pilot the operation of a sustainable financing mechanism (the BGF) for those parks; and,

(e) **Extractive Industries (EI) Sectors Technical Assistance Project** (SPF US\$3.2 million) approved July 28, 2011 and designed to improve governance and institutional performance in the EI sectors, ensure that sector investments are environmentally and socially sustainable and increase their contribution to local employment and income generation. Government's request for Bank support of this project was clearly catalyzed by the CBMP through CAIA/partners' work on stimulating debate about extractive industries and environmental/social issues. The project includes a component to further strengthen institutional, legislative and technical capacities established under the CBMP.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

3.1.1 Project objectives (PDO and GEO) remain highly relevant and continue to resonate in the World Bank's assistance strategy for Guinea-Bissau and its specific development needs and priorities. Due to political uncertainties in-country, an Interim Strategy Note (ISN), discussed by the Board in June 2009 and intended to cover FY 2009-10, remains current, but a new CAS is under preparation. The ISN supports IDA and trust fund financing for investments notably in rural areas, for coastal and biodiversity support, and to increase access to basic services. At the micro level also, the Project's support for demand-led, community-based development approaches – as financed by FIAL in/around the National Parks under the CBMP – is strongly emphasized in the ISN and reflected in a new Bank-supported project (see 2.5.3). Such approaches can play an important role in encouraging broad-based participation, social capital formation and improved governance at the local level in a country with major, persisting political and social pressures.

3.1.2 Project content was entirely relevant to country needs but the design - as reflected in the aggregation of this content in one operation and its overall level of difficulty, as well as the indicators for measuring/capturing the full range of project outcomes, was not optimal for country circumstances and would, *prima facie* and given global best practice examples, have suggested the need for re-consideration. However, this complex operation not only demonstrated many successes but became the testing ground for innovations leading directly to a series of important new operations building on key “pieces” of the CBMP. Also, as intended, institutional development of the three core project-created agencies and the PMU under the CBMP was substantial, resulting in increased capacity both under the CBMP itself over time to implement complex project activities and for application to other, related national projects in the future, Bank/donor-supported or otherwise. Thus, the relevance of project implementation - and methodology - remains high.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives and Global Environment Objectives **Project Development Objectives (PDO):**

3.2.1 Achievement of the PDO is rated Moderately Satisfactory. This Project achieved or came close to achieving the core goals embedded in the PDO, based on its Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and other supporting information/achievements. These achievements were obtained in a profoundly challenging country context, cost-effectively and with promising sustainability, and with just a one-year extension of the Project's closing date. This rating is in line with the final ISR. See below and Annex 2.

3.2.2 Government's capacity to collaboratively manage coastal environments and biodiversity for conservation and sustainable development ends was increased as follows: (i) two new public sector institutions – IBAP and CAIA – were created and consolidated, each with significant autonomy but technically and operationally synergistic and complementary, and with strong linkages to relevant sector Ministries; (ii) through the Project's FIAL instrument (designed to be fully-integrated in IBAP over time), Government developed an institutional methodology for decentralization and participatory, sustainable local development which became the paradigm for further scaling up. FIAL's micro-project investment activities with Park communities supported IBAP's overall park management role by providing CDD incentives to build community commitment to park conservation efforts and reduce pressure on natural resources in Protected Areas, while promoting sustainable development and improved livelihoods *in situ*. At no time did

Government seek to ring-fence the Parks and remove resident communities.²³ (iii) acting in collaboration or individually and utilizing the knowledge and skills gained from project-sponsored training and on-the-job experience, these institutions increased the area of globally significant habitats under effective - legally and physically formalized, patrolled and annually measured - protection and conservation; (iv) the Project prepared Action Plans for three priority endangered species within the Parks and started implementation; and (v) evidence suggests important species in the five Parks have increased populations during and as a result of improved, collaborative management. These outcomes are considered highly relevant to poor communities residing in the Parks and heavily dependent on Park resources, and whose sustainable development and protection have potential *inter alia*, as development poles for the coastal region and a possible future eco-tourism industry.

3.2.3 IBAP and CAIA were instrumental in preparing the analytical basis for new laws and regulatory frameworks for modern conservation and protection policies/procedures affecting the environment and natural resources management more generally, and coastal and marine biodiversity specifically. These institutions also collaborated to create mechanisms for the longer-term financial, physical and operational sustainability of these conservationist regimes, e.g., the Bio-Guinea Foundation and pay-for-service environmental assessment of proposed development projects by CAIA (fees), and spawned new Bank-supported operations to scale up or bring into operation successful elements of the CBMP. Working with relevant Ministries, donors and stakeholders, the Project helped to prepare and secure Ministerial approval of a National Fisheries Strategy guiding the future, rational exploitation and conservation of important fisheries, their breeding grounds and nurseries, established regular physical surveillance and monitoring of Marine Protected Areas and Reserved Fishing Zones, and secured the formal approval of important fisheries legislation and regulations.

3.2.4 The capacity of natural resource users such as farmers and fishermen to collaboratively manage coastal environments and biodiversity for conservation and sustainable development ends was strengthened by the piloting of methodologies including financial incentives, organization and capacity building: (i) of critical importance, the 26-member Park Management Committees (with 50% community participation) and the Participatory Park Patrols established a collaborative ethic supporting sustainable development in each Park; and (ii) organized communities residing in and around the Protected Areas had access via FIAL to small-scale, socio-economic investments with conservationist goals. These used simple, innovative technologies designed to increase incomes and improve social infrastructure while curbing deforestation, improving drainage, conserving water and protecting water sources, preserving mangrove zones and building local ownership of the principles and practices supporting sustainable fisheries and coastal management. Not all investments had or were intended to have direct conservationist impacts, e.g., schools, but FIAL conveyed a strong message through project-financed communications campaigns about the link between the environment and sustainable livelihoods, the meaning of conservation *per se*, and the need for organized, community-based approaches.

²³ See Porter-Bolland et al., 2011, which examined the effectiveness of “strict Protected Areas” (IUCN categories I-IV) compared to community-managed forests where “multiple use takes place under a variety of tenure, benefit sharing and governance schemes” and where “effectiveness” is defined as a change in forest cover over time, a definition which fits the CBMP’s Protected Areas because unlike most IUCN classified Parks, the CBMP parks have people living in them (in non-core areas). Greater rule-making autonomy at the local level is associated with better forest management and livelihood benefits. On the whole, community-managed forests performed better than “strict” Protected Areas in having lower annual deforestation rates.

Improved educational opportunities and literacy were seen as longer-term investments in sustainability. Evaluations indicate these various instruments effectively promoted conservation messages. Local communities understood the direct link between FIAL interventions, their proximity to/residence in the Parks, and their willingness to participate in conserving associated biodiversity and natural resources.

3.2.5 An important example of institutional/stakeholder collaboration for conservationist and sustainable development ends was the rapid and effective FIAL-financed pilot effort to restore seawater-flooded lowland rice paddies threatening the subsistence and livelihoods of 3,000 people as well as forested upland areas vulnerable to invasion and deforestation by these same groups if the paddies were not reclaimed. FIAL partnered with the Ministry of Culture, NGOs, local extension agents, local leaders and communities to repair the paddies and improve drainage. The results included bumper crops, higher incomes, and avoided environmental degradation.

KPI 1: At least 3,500 sq. km of land and water under improved management, according to a score derived from the WWF/World Bank Protected Areas Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool by end-project.

3.2.6 **This KPI was substantially achieved:** (i) IBAP created two new Protected Areas: Cantanhez National Park and the Urok Community Marine Protected Area totaling 160,267 ha, equivalent to 1,602 km² or 4.4% of the national territory. This brought under improved management a total 5,370 sq. km - terrestrial and marine - equivalent to 15% of the national territory (Table 2.3.1, Annex 2); (ii) IBAP conducted annual reviews of the five National Parks using the WWF/World Bank Protected Areas Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool, collaborating with Park Directors, rangers and local partners including the community Participatory Patrols. All these Parks showed continuous improvement and good final scores vs. difficult targets - Cufada Park exceeded its target (Table 2.4.1, Annex 2); (iii) Bank/international technical specialists independently reviewed the Park Management Plans, physically inspected each park and applied the Tracking Tool. Cross-checking with the regular, local assessments showed that score-cards were consistent, that the Park Management Plans were of good quality for the stage of Park development, and that Guinea-Bissau's performance was equal or superior to that of other park services in West Africa of similar characteristics and goals. In addition, Endangered Species Action Plans were prepared for Chimpanzees, Colobus monkeys and Turtles (implementation commenced after project closing); evidence strongly suggests that improved Park management over the course of the Project increased the populations of key species. (See also Annex 2).

KPI 2: As of January 1, 2007, the number of infringements of the applicable regulatory framework related to the Reserved Fishing Zones by fishing vessels decreases by 10% per year in relation to the baseline established in calendar year 2006.

3.2.7 **This KPI was substantially achieved:** Achievements were as follows: (i) formal monitoring of the decrease in infringements indicates that the 10% annual target was first attained by 2010;²⁴ (ii) construction of the Caravela Fisheries Surveillance Station was completed in mid-2010, equipped and is operational, using two surveillance patrol vessels financed by the Government of Turkey. As noted elsewhere, this KPI was ambitious, not well-designed to capture

²⁴ Monitoring activities have only been conducted formally on a bi-monthly schedule since mid-2009. However, surveillance patrols did commence in 2006 with impacts observed on the incidence, number/diversity of species and average size of fish coinciding with increased detention of unauthorized fishing vessels in Marine Protected Areas of João Vieira e Poilao, and Orango.

real achievements, and involved the resolution of complex legal and regulatory issues to establish the baseline permitting the monitoring of infringements – as a direct result, the baseline was only able to be formally established in 2009.

3.2.8 In addition: (i) the applicable Fisheries Regulatory Framework was formalized via signature of the *Despacho Ministerial Conjunto* by the Ministry of Agriculture and State Secretariat of Fisheries in March 2010 setting the legal stage for formally monitoring regulatory infringements; (ii) the General Fisheries Law and the Artisanal Fisheries Regulations, as well as decrees for the creation and regulation of the Reserve Fishing Zones (RFZ), were approved by the Council of Ministers in January 2010 and promulgated prior to project closing; (iii) as a multiplier effect of the legal framework, regulations, methodology and monitoring schemes for the Rio Buba RFZ, other RFZs were created by Government in principal rivers and estuaries (Cufada Lagoon, Rio Cacine, the Canafeque and Melo Islands, and Rio Cacheu); (iv) the PMU worked with the Ministry of Fisheries and despite fluctuating support, inserted RFZ efforts into the Ministry's work program, strengthening the governance of fisheries surveillance and management;²⁵ and (v) a National Fisheries Strategy was approved by the Council of Ministers in 2011, based on an inclusive, participatory national dialogue.

KPI 3: As of January 1, 2007, the Government provides sufficient financial resources to cover the operational and maintenance costs of all fisheries surveillance activities (including surveillance stations, vessels and patrols).

3.2.9 **This KPI was achieved:** Government started in 2010 to contribute budget resources to fisheries surveillance activities through support for operation and maintenance costs of patrol vessels, the Caravela Station and surveillance staff. The total amount of the contribution was US\$ 183,000. Through this action, Government is sending a positive signal - consistent with its strong support for important legislation and strategic approaches approved/put in place by the Project - that its commitment to responsible fisheries' management has strengthened. The new West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (Guinea-Bissau) provides opportunity for the Bank/donors to promote recurrent Government budget support for and to further strengthen, surveillance activities.

KPI 4: All public and private development projects eligible for review are submitted for environmental impact assessment (EIA) review prior to being implemented.

3.2.10 **This KPI was achieved:** CAIA is now reviewing 100% of all public and private development projects prior to implementation based on the approval, ratification and publication in 2010 of the Environmental Impact Assessment Law which also granted CAIA fee-for-service authority to support its future sustainability. In addition: (i) CAIA was established by Decree as the National Environmental Evaluation Agency (NEEA) with its respective statutes; (ii) a Decree approved the creation of *Pontos Focais* and *Antenas Setoriais* - institutional extensions of CAIA's mandate - located within key public ministries/agencies and in the regions to ensure integration of national safeguards policies and the environmental agenda into national development; (iii) the Basic Environmental Law was also approved enabling Government to regulate development processes on the basis of environmental considerations; and, (iv) CAIA

²⁵ This situation has improved since the coordinator for the project fisheries activities in the PMU was then appointed as Secretary of State for Fisheries.

prepared environmental reference guides for the following economic sectors: Fisheries, Industry, Tourism, Energy, Infrastructure, Water, Hydro-carbons and Mining. See also Annex 2.

KPI 5: 75% of micro-projects (MPs) funded by the Community Fund (Fundo de Iniciativas Ambientais Locais – FIAL) each year are considered to have satisfactorily achieved their objectives.

3.2.11 This KPI was achieved: (i) Three separate evaluation exercises studied all 129 FIAL-financed micro-projects finding high levels of community satisfaction and achievement of micro-project objectives; (ii) scores by the final year averaged 81.3% vs. the KPI target of 75%; (iii) impact and physical evaluations (see 3.6.1 and Annex 5) showed why beneficiary satisfaction rates were high, improved over time and were not related solely to the acquisition of a physical good; and (iv) FIAL invested in rehabilitation of 4,208 ha of rice paddies; preparation of 12 ha of lands and appropriate technical assistance for communal horticultural activities; installation of 130 beehives; construction of 10 pens for small ruminants; establishment of 16 palm oil production units with presses; equipping of 24 artisanal fishing groups; construction of 48 wells equipped with manual pump devices; and, the construction and equipping of 54 school rooms, three community stores and several health posts; (v) ex-post analysis of five typical FIAL micro-projects found positive IRRs ranging from 21.17% for lowland rice to 50.13% for palm oil production, indicating good income generation and wellbeing potential for poor communities; and (vi) investments benefited 2,000 families or about 10,000 people residing in the Parks and buffer zones, some 4,320 students and 19 producer associations. FIAL experience/lessons led to the new IDA-financed SDR 3.3 million (US\$5.0 m. equivalent) Rural Community-driven Development Project.

Global Environment Objective (GEO):

3.2.12 Achievement of the GEO is rated Moderately Satisfactory. It takes account of the Key Indicator, measured in the same manner as the PDO KPI 1, using the WWF/World Bank Tracking Tool combined with other preliminary evidence. The Tracking Tool does not permit a definitive determination that the Project “strengthened the conservation of globally significant eco-systems and species in Guinea-Bissau” and in any case, the Tool was applied within the Biosphere Reserve but not the buffer zones or the RFZs (the latter were not formally established until January 2010). The Project targeted the eco-systems and species in five terrestrial and marine Parks constituting about 15% of the national territory. Assessing “strengthened conservation of globally-important eco-systems and species” as well as “eco-system health and function” is largely a supply-side judgment at this stage pending formal technical and scientific studies using a series of appropriate outcomes and outputs capable of encompassing the scope of the original GEO. While aggregate achievements under the Project suggest that this objective can be achieved over time, it was unlikely to be measurable within the life of the Project.

KPI 1: Eco-system health and function maintained or improved within protected areas, their buffer zones, the Biosphere Reserve and fishing reserves.

3.2.13 This KPI was substantially achieved: (i) Annual scoring conducted by IBAP using the Tracking Tool, and with participation of local partners and validation by international conservation experts shows that through January 2011 – the most recent exercise by IBAP – all five Parks registered strong annual gains and good end-project results given the challenging targets; Cufada Park met/exceeded its target; (ii) preliminary evidence suggests eco-system health and function was improved within both marine and terrestrial Protected Areas: populations of

manatee, elephant, hippopotamus, sea turtle, grey parrot and diverse fish species all increased, based on community surveys, observations by park rangers, and marine surveillance/fishing activities. See Annex 2.

3.2.14 Beyond the KPI, project-financed activities helped to strengthen the conservation of globally important eco-systems and species characteristic of coastal and marine zones of Guinea-Bissau, including: (i) successful collaboration between IBAP and FIAL within the Parks, through community development investments using simple conservationist technologies backed by training and communications campaigns; (ii) systematic surveillance and monitoring of the physical health/status of the Parks including marine; (iii) mapping of three specific species (Chimpanzees, Colobus monkeys and Turtles) and preparation of Endangered Species Action Plans for their protection and/or conservation – implementation of these plans has started; (iv) review, analysis and publication of historic turtle data; (v) in partnership with Park communities, testing methods for managing conflicts between communities and species, e.g., hippopotamus' incursion of crops; (vi) complementary approval and regulation of essential environmental legislation, including CAIA's role as primary environmental gatekeeper.

3.3 Efficiency

3.3.1 This project has generated a range of benefits, such as biodiversity protection, critical fishery habitat protection, poverty alleviation through productivity and income increase, as well as better institutional capacity and an improved education system. Some of these are monetary benefits that can be quantified (e.g., revenue and profits) and some are non-monetary benefits that are less easily quantified (e.g., conservation of fisheries and marine resources). Some of the non-monetary benefits, however, will also support economic development through their effects on improving fishery stocks and harvests. Furthermore, significant externalities exist due to better management of national resources in Guinea-Bissau and better information sharing in national and international biodiversity networks.

3.3.2 To the extent that information is available, the CBMP assisted 129 different communities with an equal number of micro-project grants averaging about XOF 7.31 million (US\$16,045) each. Since some 75% of these grants were used for income-generating activities, the total of XOF 730.94 million (US\$1.60 million) in project funding allocated to these micro-projects is estimated to have generated a minimum of 25% in revenues to local communities, or at least XOF 182.74 million (US\$0.40 million) in net earnings over the life of the micro-projects.²⁶

3.3.3 On the operational side, it can be noted that disbursement for operating costs is about 17% of the total credit, being on the high side for operating costs. This can be justified by the US Dollar devaluation, mainly in 2007 and 2008, and rising fuel costs that pushed up funding requirements during implementation and could not have been foreseen, the budgetary implications of the rural/outdoors nature of many project activities were inadequately accounted for in project design and rapidly became a constraint. Despite this, the Project used its resources very efficiently, as seen in IBAP's astute management of limited resources, its leveraging activities, and its decision to cancel a significant part of an expensive international technical

²⁶ This is based on aggregate cost of XOF 943,547,277 (US\$2.07 m) for 129 MPs. Project funding was XOF 730,946,947 (US\$1.60 m) and beneficiary contribution (in labor and materials) of XOF 212,600,330 (US\$0.47 m). Closing date exchange rate of US\$1.00 = FCFA 455.6 was utilized.

assistance consultancy for project management in favor of self-management and further institutional growth.

On the implementation side, due to the Project's institution-building goals, and the experimental nature of the FIAL instrument, no economic analysis was done at appraisal. At appraisal, due to its primarily institutional focus – establishing a new institutional framework and strengthening the capacity of stakeholders to manage biodiversity and Protected Areas – the Project was deemed as not lending itself to traditional cost-benefit analysis and estimation of rates of return. However, during preparation of the related IDA-financed Guinea-Bissau Rural Community-Driven Development Project (P090712) a detailed analysis was conducted of five representative micro-projects financed by the CBMP's Fund for Local Environmental Initiatives (FIAL).²⁷ This analysis found that FIAL's production and income-generating micro-projects had positive Internal Rates of Return (IRR) and Net Present Value (NPV). For micro-projects that provided public goods, e.g., schools, an incremental cost analysis was used, but in the case of water wells, which can have both positive health and economic impacts simultaneously, the analysis was based on the value of time saved – time that can be used for productive activities. The successful integration of conservation with economic and social goals - along with strong evidence of reliable operation and maintenance practices - also contribute positively to the sustainability of these investments." (See Annex 3).

3.3.4 The total amount of the project used for Natural Resources Management (which includes IDA and the EU) totals US\$ 4.8 million, out of which, US\$ 1.60 million (31%) was used for micro-projects (FIAL). There was no economic analysis for all the micro-projects, but an ex-post analysis of the five typical FIAL micro-projects, found positive IRRs ranging from 21.17% for the rehabilitation of *bas fond* (lowland) rice dykes to 50.13% for palm oil production. Net Present Value (NPV) ranged from CFA 219,700 for the former to CFA 8.2 million for the latter. Returns on school buildings - using an incremental cost analysis - showed an incremental increase in student output of 466%, compared with an incremental increase in student cost of just 45% (see Annex 3).

3.3.5 At the level of the Project Management Unit and IBAP in the capital Bissau, the fiscal impact would also have been positive but small since it would mostly have involved the payment of sales taxes for purchases made by project employees and sub-contractors, and any other taxes accruing to formal employment. In addition, about 60% of the US\$1.60 million (not including in-kind community contribution) used for funding micro-projects would have been used to purchase construction materials not available in the communities, as well as transportation and lodging. In all these cases the fiscal impact would be indirect, through increased sales taxes and import taxes.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome and Global Environment Outcome Rating

Ratings: **PDO – Satisfactory/ GEO – Moderately Satisfactory**

3.4.1 The overall PDO and GEO outcome ratings are based on the following factors: (i) efficacy was substantial with minor shortcomings; (ii) continuing relevance of Project objectives - PDO and GEO - to country circumstances and to the Interim Strategy; (iii) relevance of the micro-project experience for its positive social, environmental and/or economic impacts on beneficiaries and demonstration effects in a desperately poor country; (iv) substantial achievement of both the PDO and GEO with greater maturity and more formal study likely to validate preliminary findings; (v) operating within five Protected Areas housing important ecosystems and species, the Project introduced new, complementary institutions, prepared Park

²⁷ See PAD, Guinea-Bissau Rural Community-Driven Development Project (P090712), Report #49557-GW.

Management Plans, established park management systems on the ground, approved and regulated essential legislation, mapped three unique and threatened species for protective treatment, and trained 10,000 stakeholders to take ownership of the national conservation and sustainable development agenda in the Parks; (vi) economic analysis of five typical FIAL micro-projects showed positive rates of return in all cases, while repeat evaluation of FIAL micro-projects showed high rates of beneficiary satisfaction; (vii) important lessons were learned for follow-on and similar projects; (viii) the Project inspired and justified new, innovative poverty reduction, fisheries, extractive industries and conservation-related operations, potentially enhancing the sustainability of CBMP gains through planned synergies, and expanding their scope/scale; and (ix) the Bank/Government dialogue on natural resource management and governance was strengthened by the formative Cufada Park experience.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

3.5.1 Poverty: Micro-projects using new technologies resulted in improved productivity and higher incomes, family wellbeing was improved by basic investments in clean, regular water supply, and social capital – an important determinant in reducing poverty – was improved in beneficiary communities. FIAL’s conservation messages also built community awareness that sustainable livelihoods for park residents depended *inter alia*, on their careful stewardship of Park resources.

3.5.2 Gender: Project design had no explicit gender focus but the methodology for preparing the Local Development Plans was designed *inter alia*, to promote the involvement of vulnerable groups, especially women. Gender became a micro-project focus and Bank supervision missions sought women’s views separately from the men to obtain unbiased feedback. Women tended to manage the O&M funds, many communities sought to ensure women benefited preferentially from the choice of micro-project, e.g., smoked fish in Buba (where the women also had their own accounts with a micro-credit facility), women-only horticulture ventures, and wells established within the community area. Even so, the FIAL evaluations deemed it important to implement a gender analysis in the Protected Areas mainly in communities already benefited to insert basic principles of equity in the distribution of tasks and access to/control of resources and benefits.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

3.5.3 The core of this project was institution-building, creating new institutions with Government authority but outside the civil service pay structure. The collaboration of IBAP, FIAL and CAIA created important synergies and these institutions evolved rapidly. Sustained support from the Bank’s project team and contracted specialists complemented this developmental process but it is the quality of the country implementation institutions/staff – PMU, IBAP, CAIA and FIAL - which explains 90% of project outcomes. Even adverse conditions such as the acute shortage of resources for basic project activities became formative experiences. The PMU and core institutions adapted well to these circumstances using available funds effectively and astutely leveraging additional resources through partnerships. Even though project funding for Component I closed out in early 2010, IBAP maintained its park activities by leveraging support - with the Bank as facilitator - from donor partners under 2010 and 2011 emergency interim funding efforts.²⁸ While there was some turnover of key positions from 2006-2009 and

²⁸ IBAP leveraged sufficient funds to cover all staff salaries and key recurrent operating expenditures (e.g., surveillance patrols, Park Management Council meetings), albeit with delays due to the late arrival of resources and unfortunate coincidence with onset of the rainy season.

again near Closing as staff sought other employment including with new Bank-supported operations, the Project stayed on course due to the “recycling” of experienced professionals from the pool of such people familiar with the project since inception; disruptive effects were minimal.²⁹ This factor also helped the Project weather the instability within line ministries. Obligated to keep functioning given the one year extension of the Closing Date and with few resources, the PMU aggregated functions under the remaining staff, including the Coordinator of IBAP, who not only took on the PMU Coordinator position but did an excellent job without salary. The only aspect of institutional growth which did not evolve sufficiently was procurement and this requires a more strategic Bank approach to build skills and promote good governance beyond Bank-supported projects.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

3.5.4 Positive, unintended outcomes included the following: (i) A team of international technical specialists was contracted two years after effectiveness, following a difficult procurement process. PMU staff rightly felt that they had already gone through the most difficult aspects of learning to implement the Project, did not need this team, and questioned the benefit of spending the Project’s scarce resources on foreign consultants. Contracts were cut short and the PMU team assumed full responsibility for the Project, a commendable and prudent decision with an impressive pay-off for institutional growth and project quality; (ii) Astute resource leveraging not only plugged financing gaps but helped to crowd in other donors. While all core activities (IBAP, FIAL, CAIA, the Parks) were Project-financed, new donor support was invaluable for facilitating enhancement activities and was another expression of confidence in the Project; (iii) An exhibit on biodiversity for the International Year of Biodiversity - “*Nha Terra*” - comprising large-scale, exceptional photos of Park residents with native food and medicinal plants and with supporting text on Park conservation goals - was shown in Japan, France, China and Mauritania and merits display at World Bank headquarters; and, (iv) Bijagos Archipelago has prompted a proposal for United Nations World Heritage Site status, another vote of confidence in the Parks.³⁰

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

3.6.1 The following summarizes findings of the final (d’Alva, 2011) of three evaluations covering all 129 FIAL micro-projects. The study assessed 45 more recently-executed micro-projects in the five Parks, using field surveys and semi-structured and informal interviews with beneficiaries and local stakeholders and found: (i) satisfaction levels were universally high, especially on the part of direct beneficiaries who identified many positive aspects of FIAL and even suggested further improvements; (ii) beneficiary communities saw FIAL’s participatory approach as enabling them to analyze their problems and formulate solutions collectively; (iii) gender was a micro-project focus, despite the dominant presence of men in leadership positions, and important lessons were learned for gender approaches; (iv) communities participated at all stages of their micro-project - diagnosis, proposal preparation, implementation, operation and maintenance; (vii) Some communities expressed concern that the financial processes involved in their micro-project be decided and managed transparently to avoid loss of interest/motivation. See details Annex 5.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome and Global Environment Outcome

4.1.1 Achievements supporting the positive Development Outcome and Global Environmental Outcome ratings are rated at moderate risk due to country factors, mitigated by the intense focus

²⁹ The Coordinators of Fisheries activities and CAIA changed in 2006 and 2007 respectively, while the National PMU Coordinator position turned over in 2008 and again in 2009, as well as the Executive Secretary of FIAL.

³⁰ Also unanticipated: books on turtles and the medicinal plants of Orango Park; a database on all species existing in each of the five Parks; and a new IBAP headquarters building financed by the Government of Spain.

on sustainability throughout and new operations designed to boost CBMP sustainability. The main factors supporting this rating are as follows:

(a) **Bio-Guinea Foundation (FBG):** At the time of ICR preparation, a Board of Directors had been established and articles of incorporation finalized/validated. The FBG was legally incorporated offshore (in the United Kingdom as agreed by its Committee) and the protocol for signature by FBG and Government was drafted, along with the Foundation's Operational Manual. Government requested EUR 1.0 million in initial capitalization for FBG as part of its commercial fisheries agreement with the EU, and another US\$2.0 - 4.0 million has been sought from the GEF 5. Decisions are pending in both cases.³¹

(b) **Transitional financing:** IBAP successfully negotiated - with the Bank as catalyst - emergency contributions to its core recurrent management costs for 2010 and 2011 from donor partners with ongoing projects in Guinea-Bissau. Transitional funding also includes limited support from the following: the US\$950,000 GEF Biodiversity Conservation Trust Fund medium-sized project (BCTF) approved in July 2010; and, the IDA SDR 1.3 million, Biodiversity Conservation Project (BCP). Aggregated with the two new CDD projects, the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program, and the Extractive Industries Sector Project, these operations essentially pick up where CBMP left off and bridge the gap pending an endowed FBG.

(c) **Environmental Impact Assessment Law:** The approved EIA Law sets the legal basis for mainstreaming environmental and social considerations into future development and economic growth while legally reinforcing CAIA's institutional role in biodiversity conservation. Official approval to create the *Pontos Focais* and *Antenas Setoriais* within key public agencies and regionally extends/strengthens CAIA's environmental assessment authority across sectors. CAIA's sustainability will be buttressed by its ability to charge fees for service but additional donor support might be needed.³²

(d) **Operation and maintenance of micro-projects:** As noted elsewhere, FIAL/facilitating stakeholders felt it was neither prudent nor appropriate to walk away from communities upon completion of their micro-projects but to withdraw gradually as they demonstrated capacity to manage them. As noted by the BCR (2011), in all cases of FIAL-financed basic infrastructure, communities were assisted in organizing a management committee, with a maintenance plan and fund for replacements.

(e) **Fisheries outcomes:** The new West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (Guinea-Bissau) is expected to deepen relationships of trust and commitment within the Ministry of Fisheries and related agencies and promote further discussion with the Bank on the importance of the RFZ to the overall health of the fisheries sector. Given their dependence on Government budget however, certain gains under the fisheries sub-component, e.g., fisheries monitoring and surveillance activities within the RFZs, may be difficult to sustain.

(f) **National budget allocations:** Government allocated budget in 2011 for fisheries surveillance activities, a positive signal which the Bank is following up, but was unable to honor its promise to allocate - as an exit strategy - regular budget to IBAP or CAIA. Government's demonstrated financial commitment will be vital to donor willingness to capitalize the FBG. Government attributed its budget shortfall to fiscal constraints associated with meeting Highly-indebted Poor Country (HIPC) program triggers, and the unexpected suspension of budget support by the EU following the political violence of 2010.

³¹ Given that the dialogue was starting from scratch and the level of biodiversity awareness was modest, expecting the FBG to be endowed and fully-operational by project closing was unrealistic. Global experience shows that such entities take time to establish and consolidate, and conservation trust funds were, at appraisal, still largely experimental with few best practice models. Operating a modestly-staffed and equipped system for IBAP and the existing parks would cost an estimated EUR 700,000 p.a. (excluding investment costs), implying an optimal FBG endowment of some EUR 14.0 million.

³² Some 60% of the fees - potentially differentiated based on the sector or type of development project - would be retained by CAIA, with the remainder going to the general Government budget. CAIA's estimated costs are around US\$100,000 p.a. to be secured through service fees and eligibility for regular budget allocations, the latter still "on the table" in terms of Government commitment.

(g) **FIAL:** FIAL acts to boost sustainability at the micro level, financing grass-roots initiatives which satisfy the immediate needs of communities with common interests; training communities to participate in monitoring and evaluating environmental impacts, managing biodiversity and adopting the sustainable use of natural resources in the parks. However, other factors such as literacy – fostered through FIAL investment in school infrastructure - community organization and poverty will also influence the sustainability of conservation initiatives.

(h) **Cufada Park:** The Cufada Park experience represented a major milestone in the Bank's relationship with the Government and in defining how the Bank can support the national sustainability agenda. Cufada became a national governance issue rather than a side/sector issue, creating a new discussion on how to balance safeguards compliance, sustainability and development, and where to draw the boundaries of the Bank's involvement and responsibilities and demonstrating that new projects need to accurately describe the nature of the Bank's interventions and where liabilities are both within and beyond the life of the Project.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

5.1.1 The Quality at Entry (QAE) rating balances several factors: (i) painstaking Bank efforts from 2000 on to build commitment to the project concept, construct a dialogue with stakeholders, provide intellectual and technical leadership, find the appropriate institutional “seat” for Protected Areas management, and do the foundational studies/analysis; (ii) inclusive preparation involving academia, multi- and bilateral entities/donors, public and private bodies, targeted beneficiaries, local leaders and authorities; (iii) project institutional arrangements designed to weather conflict and Government transitions and to insulate new institutions from erratic budgets; (iv) but, the project tried to do too much with too little, a design shortcoming in a post-conflict country with limited capacity;³³ and (v) Project objectives addressed country needs but were overly-ambitious for country circumstances, requiring a period well beyond the Project to mature and be fully measurable (not however, atypical for such a project where trends, eco-systems and species need measurement over longer periods).

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: **Satisfactory**

5.1.2 The Satisfactory rating for supervision quality is derived from an exceptionally strong, sustained performance out-weighing other factors, as follows: (i) timely, proactive and candidly-reported supervision with a minimum of two field supervision missions per year; (ii) consistent efforts to build relationships within and outside government under difficult country conditions and frequent turnover of high-level authorities; (iii) priority given to sustainability, knowledge transfer/mentoring, fiduciary and safeguards performance and governance, and to counterpart and donor relations; (iv) strong skills mix, including a senior Bank biodiversity specialist, and a leading international expert on conservation trust funds (i.e., foundations); (v) resourceful use of Skype and audio-conferencing between supervision missions to maintain regular, cost-effective contact with country counterparts; (vi) timely, firm intervention to convene stakeholders to resolve the Cufada Park issue, including enlisting the CMU's support to raise difficult Safeguards issues with Government during the Spring Meetings; (vii) the Team, supported by Management,

³³ Sources suggest the Project needed a min. US\$2.0 million in additional funding to achieve its slate of activities.

navigated the Project through this process in a very difficult operating environment and must be commended for mastering the issue, building awareness in-country and elevating the importance of the EIA process; and (viii) consistent focus on long-term sustainability of project focal point institutions and project outcomes/achievements including astute leveraging of follow-up Bank and donor support through new operations.

5.1.3 Quality of Supervision Assessment (QSA): These positive factors are validated by a Quality of Supervision Assessment (QSA 7) which rated supervision as Satisfactory overall and for three of the four quality dimensions: focus on development effectiveness, supervision of fiduciary/safeguards aspects; and the quality and candor of Implementation Supervision Reports (ISR). The Panel rated the fourth quality dimension – adequacy of supervision inputs and processes – as Highly Satisfactory based on the Task Team’s efforts.

5.1.4 The main caveats are: (i) not having formally restructured the KPI, although the ICR acknowledges the Team’s concerns at the time (supported by Bank management), and the fact that the team took the active decision not to pursue full restructuring. Further, generally good performance under fisheries and other activities/components by the time of closing compensated for cuts made at the time of the MTR and outweighed earlier concerns about potentially poor achievements for fisheries activities; and (ii) failure to resolve capacity gaps of the Procurement Specialist through training and mentoring.

5.1.5 The project had six different Task Team Leaders (TTL) from 1997 to 2011 but each TTL held responsibility for a substantial period - especially after effectiveness - the transitions were smooth, and replacement TTLs mostly tended to be drawn from the original project team “pool” so that the aggregate institutional memory and the team’s stability were largely preserved over the period (see 2.2.1). Supervision budgets were generally adequate and well-managed.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

5.1.6 Downgrading the rating for quality at entry on the basis of design and budgeting issues irrespective of the top quality groundwork done to bring Government on board, reflects the problems these factors caused during implementation. Supervision on the other hand, was exceptionally good, noting the two caveats mentioned. The difficult context, huge risks and potential for error also need to be considered. On balance and applying OPCS’ directives for assessing performance ratings, the rating for Bank performance is Moderately Satisfactory.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

5.2.1 Government’s performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory, taking into account the following: (i) support for and approval of innovative and wide-ranging legislation incorporating modern coastal and biodiversity management principles and practices – an important goal of the Project; (ii) strong, sustained support for the Cufada Park Action Plan, for CAIA’s EIA function, and for the FBG, meriting recognition given Guinea Bissau’s few alternatives for national economic development; (iii) provision of tax exemptions of around US\$372,000 on imported goods acquired by the project, as partial compensation for its lack of budget transfers to IBAP. The following aspects compromised a possible justification for a fully satisfactory rating, though: (i) the government’s lackluster commitment to the fisheries sub-component, partially explained by its late inclusion which excluded the Ministry/sector from the Bank-managed process of building ownership and awareness over time; (ii) failure to honor an agreed exit strategy whereby IBAP and CAIA would receive regular budget transfers.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Rating: **Highly Satisfactory**

5.2.2 The quality of the implementing agencies' performance - PMU, IBAP, CAIA and FIAL - was outstanding and characterized by the following: (i) consistently good management of a difficult project across a broad gamut of activities and while learning on the job, resulting in the Project's many successes; (ii) high level of commitment, evident in willingness to maintain the pace and quality of project execution even when budget difficulties and failure of Government to do its part meant key personnel went unpaid for months; (iii) astute, timely and successful efforts to leverage additional resources for the Project through partnerships and other arrangements; (iv) consistently good FM performance, only downgraded in the final year due to audit delays over which the PMU had little control, and systems issues; (v) comparatively strong performance on M&E despite a steep learning curve, and production of good quality, useful and timely data/analyses including the Final Report (2011), three evaluations, regular Tracking Tool surveys and species monitoring reports. The only substantive caveat on the PMU's performance is procurement, but fault was clearly shared: a marked lack of procurement capacity in Guinea-Bissau and the need for a more creative or definitive solution from the Bank to help break the impasse.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

5.2.3 This rating balances the mixed performance of Government - albeit noting important strengths - against a very strong performance by the PMU and focal point institutions. The challenging country conditions and technical/operational difficulty of the Project are also considered in this assessment.

6. Lessons Learned

6.1.1 The following represent the Project's more important lessons. See also important lessons from the BCR (2011) and FIAL evaluations in Annexes 5 and 7.

(a) *The sustainability of projects in countries like Guinea-Bissau benefits from multiple, donor-supported interventions over a lengthy period.* A series of follow-up projects can be the most important means for securing sustainability, and since organizational and institutional capacity is generally modest and the problems immense, multiple projects which address "segments" of large, complex sectors such as sustainable land management, environment and biodiversity, may also be the best course as reflected in new, related operations (see 2.5.3).

(b) *Stability of the Bank and Borrower core teams is advantageous, albeit not easy to achieve.* Such stability can have major advantages over time especially for technically difficult projects in troubled environments. Both CBMP teams – Bank and Borrower - are still largely in place, committed to new, related operations designed, *inter alia*, to boost the sustainability of CBMP achievements and institutions longer-term.

(c) *Intense and sustained supervision is entirely appropriate for high-risk environments like Guinea-Bissau but does not need to be costly or always direct,* face-to-face encounters with country counterparts. Regular contact via Skype for example, as the Project Team demonstrated, provides ample opportunity for timely trouble-shooting and reassures the Borrower Team that the Bank Team is continuously committed to the joint resolution of issues.

(d) *The Cufada Park experience was a milestone in the Bank's relationship with the Government, showing how the Bank can support the country's natural resource management agenda.* Cufada gained traction by becoming a national governance issue rather than a side/sector issue, creating a new discussion on how to balance safeguards compliance, sustainability and

development, and on where to draw the boundaries of the Bank's involvement and responsibilities and demonstrating that new projects need to accurately describe the nature of the Bank's interventions and where liabilities stand both within and beyond the life of the Project.

(e) ***Poor procurement performance is a serious constraint for projects in Guinea-Bissau due to the lack of in-country capacity.*** Mentoring arrangements need a formal structure with guidelines on responsibilities and expected outcomes. The procurement hub concept merits re-consideration. Cost effectively grouping of procurement staff from multiple projects for hands-on case-study and refresher courses delivered by Bank specialists can benefit Bank-supported projects while building human capital in-country and improving national governance through multiplier effects.

(f) ***The CDD approach melded with conservation incentives/goals clearly works well even in the poorest communities, and can provide substantial and sustainable benefits.*** This is especially important where institutional volatility and civil unrest persist. Such investments can proceed "under the radar" at decentralized levels, building local organizational frameworks, economic activities and social capital insulated from troubled line ministries/agencies.

(g) ***Building capacity and empowering community beneficiaries through continuous "learning by doing" which extends well beyond the specific micro-project cycle is prudent and innovative.*** The FIAL program adopted the principle that beneficiary community capacity should be tracked by local NGOs/authorities to assess communities' capacity and readiness to operate and maintain their investments on their own. Post-investment monitoring of communities' O&M performance and evolution by these entities was an unusual/innovative development meriting dissemination.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners.

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

See Client's letter, Annex 7, Part B

(b) Co-financiers N/A

(c) Other partners and stakeholders N/A

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project - P083453 (IDA)			
Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Component A: Protected Areas and Threatened Species Management	---	0.24	240.0
Component B: Natural Resource Management	1.66	1.44	86.8
Component C: Environmental and Social Safeguard Framework	0.46	0.61	132.6
Component D: Project Management and M&E	0.88	0.71	80.7
Total Baseline Cost	3.00	3.00	100.0
Physical Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0.0
Price Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0.0
Total Project Costs	3.00	3.00	100.0
PPF	0.00	0.00	0.0
Front-end fee IBRD	0.00	0.00	0.0
Total Financing Required	3.00	3.00	100.0
Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project - P049513 (GEF)			
Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Component A: Protected Areas and Threatened Species Management	2.82	2.88	102.1
Component B: Natural Resource Management	1.00	1.09	109.0
Component C: Environmental and Social Safeguard Framework	0.17	0.00	0.00
Component D: Project Management and M&E	0.81	0.83	102.5
Total Baseline Cost	4.80	4.80	100.0
Physical Contingencies	0.00	--	--
Price Contingencies	0.00	--	--
Total Project Costs	4.80	4.80	100.0

PPF	0.00	--	--
Front-end fee IBRD	0.00	--	--
Total Financing Required	4.80	4.80	100.0

(b) Financing

P083453 - Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project				
Source of Funds	Type of Financing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower		0.81	0.81	100.0
International Development Association (IDA)		3.00	3.00	100.0
P049513 - Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project				
Source of Funds	Type of Financing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower		0.09	0.00	0.0
EC: European Commission		1.59	1.86	117.0
Global Environment Facility (GEF)		4.80	4.80	100.0
The World Conservation Union		0.82	0.82	100.0

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Component 1: Protected Areas and Endangered Species Management (US\$3.73 m total cost).

2.1 This component expected to create a sustainable institutional nexus for the rational management of protected areas and coastal biodiversity. The centerpiece was to be a financially and administratively autonomous Institute for Biodiversity and Protected Areas (IBAP) to manage five Protected Areas – and possible future additional parks - in a participatory manner, and to prepare and implement action plans for at least three endangered species. National capacity for Protected Areas and species management would focus on institutional strengthening and on the management of four Protected Areas (parks), the Biosphere Reserve and the proposed new Cantanhez Park. Investments would be made in the conservation of threatened fauna initially through preparation of Endangered Species Action Plans.³⁴ The component would also finance a Technical Advisor, bio-diversity awareness activities, and capacity-building for the implementation of international conventions (Ramsar, CITES, Biodiversity, Bonn) and regional coordination of biodiversity conservation efforts.

Achievements and background:

2.2 ***IBAP established:*** IBAP was formally created with its mission defined, status legalized and operations initiated. Its structure was established, legal statutes prepared and approved, and its conservation and biodiversity responsibilities were defined along with the manner in which its responsibilities would be shared with other relevant agencies. Other actions were taken: amendment of the Protected Areas Law and related legislation to reflect IBAP's role and responsibilities; constitution of the Scientific Administration Council; preparation of administrative and financial manuals and internal regulations; installation and equipping of IBAP in its own national headquarters/premises and recruitment/training of staff; and, consolidation of financing for the initial years. IBAP then proceeded to classify and manage the Protected Areas, prepare and implement Park Management Plans, prepare (but only partially implement) management plans for threatened species, and conduct baseline studies for biodiversity inventories and monitoring.

2.3 ***Strengthened management of Protected Areas:*** IBAP strengthened the management of the Protected Areas network through the following achievements by end-Project:³⁵

- Created two additional Protected Areas: Cantanhez National Park and the Urok Community Marine Protected Area (see Table 2.4.1) totaling an additional 160,267 ha equivalent to 1,602 km² and 4.4% more national territory;
- Some 14.9% of the national territory is now under IBAP management;
- Prepared and/or updated, and validated, five Protected Area Management Plans;
- Prepared – but only partially-implemented due to lack of time and resources - Endangered Species Action Plans for Chimpanzees, Colobus monkeys and Turtles;
- Delivered/coordinated basic and specialized training of personnel in the Parks at various levels (e.g., local/other committees, councils, park rangers, communities, NGOs);

³⁴ For example, marine turtles, chimpanzees, Colobus monkeys, manatees and sea-going hippopotamus.

³⁵ The BCR notes that some of these achievements were obtained in collaboration with or co-financed by other partners (i.e., outside the project framework).

- Put in place/facilitated the establishment of participatory Park Management Councils comprising national and regional government and local civil society (NGOs, communities and leaders);
- Contributed to the process of establishing the FBG (a process ongoing at the time of ICR preparation);
- Increased its collaboration with FIAL in the Parks to achieve/consolidate conservation and development synergies;
- Coordinated – with support from the Government of Spain – construction of a permanent national headquarters building; and,
- Produced/published a series of studies, documents and media presentations resulting from the implementation of major project activities (see Annex 9).

Table 2.3.1: Protected Areas under IBAP Management by end-Project

Type of Area Protected	Name	International Designation	Area (ha)	Area (km2)	% of Territory	Institution Responsible	Legal Statute
National Park	Parque Nacional do Grupo de Ilhas de Orango	Biosphere Reserve	158,205	1,582.05	4.4%	IBAP	Decreto-Lei #11/2000
National Park	Parque Natural dos Mangais do Rio Cacheu		80,000	800.00	2.2%	IBAP	Decreto-Lei #12/2000
National Park	Parque Natural das Lagoas de Cufada	Local Ramsar	89,000	890.00	2.5%	IBAP	Decreto-Lei #13/2000
National Park	Parque Nacional Marinho João Vieira e Poilão	Biosphere Reserve	49,500	450.00	1.4%	IBAP	Decreto-Lei #6-A/2000
Marine Protected Area	Area Protegida Marinha Comunitaria das Ilhas de Urok ³⁶	Biosphere Reserve	54,500	545.00	1.5%	IBAP	Decreto-Lei #8/2005
National Park	Florestas de Cantanhez		105,767	1,057.67	2.9%	IBAP	To be published
Total:			536,972	5,369.72	14.9%		

2.4 Park Management Effectiveness: While Cufada Park's registered scores under the WWF/World Bank Protected Areas Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool were the only ones to meet/exceed target, all of the Parks showed impressive achievements compared to their ambitious targets. When scores were independently checked in the field by Bank specialists using the Tracking Tool, results were very similar to those collected by IBAP and local stakeholders as part of the annual exercise. The expert consensus was that the Park Management Plans and ranger monitoring were very good for the stage of park development and that Guinea-Bissau compared more than favorably with other, similar park services in West Africa. Scores are shown in Table 2.5.1 below.³⁷

³⁶ The Project directly-created Cantanhez national park in parallel with NGO support for the country's first community Protected Area – Marine Community Protected Area, which came to be included in the national PA network. Urok Protected Area was not financed by the Project but was managed by IBAP, using the Project methodology.

³⁷ The methodology is a rapid assessment based on a scorecard questionnaire. The scorecard includes all six elements of management identified in the IUCN-WCPA Framework (context, planning, inputs, process, outputs and outcomes) with the emphasis on the first four items. It is basic and simple to use and provides a mechanism for monitoring

Table 2.4.1: Scores using Protected Areas Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool

Protected Area	2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010/11	
	Score	%	Score	%	Score	%	Score	%	Score	%	Score	%
Orango	88	63.3	92	66.2	107	76.9	108	77.7	111	79.8	114	82.0
Cacheu	78	56.1	86	61.8	86	61.8	97	69.8	102	73.4	107	77.0
Cufada	54	56.3	47	48.9	57	59.4	62	64.6	67	69.8	75	78.1
João Vieira & Poilão	90	64.7	91	65.5	100	71.9	101	72.7	104	74.8	105	na
Cantanhez	40	na	41	na	na	na	47	na	49	na	56	na

2.5 Improved species management: Populations of key species in the Project-supported Parks increased over the life of the Project, as follows:

Manatees: A survey of Manatees and their feeding zones in Orango National Park (PNO), higher numbers of sightings were registered over time on the islands of Orango and Greater Meneque. These two islands are surrounded by thick mangroves. Feeding zones and water sources used by these animals were identified. Some 46 water sources included 4 in Canoga, 3 in Imbone, 9 in Meneque, 26 in Orango and 4 in Greater Orangozinho. Park communities surveyed noted a progressive increase in the Manatee population with the restoration of now protected feeding and watering areas. Damaged fishnets around the PNO also indicated greater numbers of Manatees.

Hippopotamus: Despite spending more time in the water, hippopotamus feed on solid ground, playing an important role in eco-systems, keeping grasses short for other animals and creating important pathways to water sources. In terms of the evolution of hippo populations, a majority of interviewees stated that pressure on this species during the 1998 war caused their numbers to decrease but numbers began to rise again following the war mainly because conservation institutions resumed their work. Communities living in the PNO and in Cacheu National Park see clear evidence that the hippo population is growing. Also, the incidence of conflicts arising over hippos damaging rice fields has risen markedly in recent years, a traditional indicator of expanding populations.

Elephant: Communities surveyed in the Cantanhez National Park, specifically in the Balana and Bedunco zones, have noted a marked increase in elephant herds year to year. This is borne out by the regular surveillance activities of community and park guards of the forest habitats of this species.

progress towards more effective management over time. It is used to enable park managers and donors to identify needs, constraints and priority actions to improve the effectiveness of Protected Area management. Tracking Tool Indicators/Variables are extensive and have undergone changes over time. In the main assessment form, 30 questions are asked each with a 4-point scale (0, 1, 2 and 3). This scale forces respondents to choose whether the situation is acceptable or not. Generally 0 is equivalent to no or negligible progress; 1 is some progress; 2 is quite good but with room for improvement; and, 3 is approaching the optimum situation. Four alternative answers are provided for each question to help assessors judge the level of the score given. In addition, there are three groups of supplementary questions which elaborate on key themes in the previous questions and provide additional information. Questions not relevant to the Protected Area are omitted and the scores adjusted. Scores are then totaled and the percentage of the possible score is calculated. The Tool's sponsors are aware that the "scoring" process is open to distortion, e.g., the assumption that all questions cover issues of equal weight. Scores provide a better assessment of effectiveness if calculated as a percentage for each of the six elements of the IUCN-WCPA Framework.

Sea turtle: Numerous reports and direct observations indicate an increase in favored beaches in the Bijagos Arquipelago for turtle spawning. This was only possible due to the intensification of enforcement, monitoring and conservation of their spawning grounds.

Grey parrot: Observations of the grey parrot on João Vieira and Middle islands of the João Vieira and Poilão National Marine Park show a sharp increase in the number of this species. In 2010, 13 counts made at five points on João Vieira and at three points on Middle Island, recorded a total 725 grey parrots, up from 114 in 2008 and 195 in 2009.

Component 2: Natural Resources Management

Sub-component 1: Provision of a grant funding mechanism (FIAL) to support sustainable use activities inside and outside of the targeted protected areas

2.6 The FIAL sub-component sought to promote conservation goals by financing small-scale investments for park residents in basic socio-economic infrastructure and productive activities, and to link the planning (LDP) processes and eventual approved micro-project to park objectives, using a classic community-driven demand methodology (CDD); approval of micro-projects was to be explicitly linked to the park objectives by the Project Management Committee. These investments were intended to reduce pressure on natural resources in protected areas and their environs; improve community living conditions; safeguard the conservation and protection of the environment and biodiversity; and, strengthen local institutions and organizations through participatory planning and improve their capacity to influence policies pertaining to environmental and natural resources management. Financing was to come from an EU Trust Fund Grant of EUR 1.47 m. (TF 090557-GUB) which, albeit two years delayed in arriving, was fully disbursed by end-project with a one-year extension. Due to the delayed arrival of EU resources, and pent-up expectations among park communities, IDA funds were reallocated for an initial FIAL pilot financing of seven micro-projects.

2.7 This sub-component would also cover costs associated with establishing the Bio-Guinea Foundation which would have two financing “windows”: a formalized FIAL financing mechanism, and a mechanism to fund IBAP’s operating costs to manage the Protected Areas.

2.8 Achievements and background:

- Some 156 micro-projects (MP) and 61 Local Development Plans were submitted for approval once FIAL initiated activities in 2007. FIAL approved 145 MP and financed 129; the 16 remaining MP were not financed due to available funds being fully-committed (see 2.8 for types of micro-projects financed);
- Data show that 70 communities had LDPs completed by end-project and 129 micro-projects were financed;³⁸ IBAP explained that an LDP could and did encompass several *tabancas* (communities) and thus several micro-projects were implemented per LDP;
- All 129 MPs were completed or very close to completion by closing and most had been formally/officially handed over to the communities for their management, operation and maintenance;

³⁸ This does not appear to have created any problems with communities or types of investments – needs are multiple and priorities quite clear from community discussions – but the ICR was unable to obtain any further information on this, e.g., whether communities obtained more than one investment.

- MPs were divided among the parks as follows: Cantanhez 27; Cufada 43; Cacheu 23; Orango 11; João Vieira e Poilão 25. All micro-projects were physically located within the Parks;
- Within the aggregate Protected Areas, 2,000 families or about 10,000 people were benefited, as were 4,320 students and 19 producer associations; and,
- The FIAL experience led directly to the new IDA-financed SDR 3.3 million (US\$5.0 million equivalent) Rural Community-driven Development Project (RCDD), and the SPF Participatory Rural Development Project (SPF US\$5.0 million).

2.9 FIAL investments financed the following:

- Rehabilitation of 4,208 ha of rice paddies
- Preparation of 12 ha of lands for communal horticultural activities
- Installation of 130 beehives
- Construction of 10 pens for small ruminants
- Establishment of 16 palm oil production units with presses
- Equipping of 24 artisanal fishing groups
- Construction of 48 wells equipped with manual pump devices
- Construction and equipping of 54 school rooms
- Construction and equipping of 3 community stores
- Construction and equipping of health posts

2.10 The FIAL Pilot: The FIAL pilot was not planned at appraisal but was prompted by the need to initiate and test the methodology in response to delayed EU funding and pent-up community expectations. While the pilot financed several types of investments including wells, the catalytic event was the destruction of extensive lowland rice paddies (*bolanhas*) due to seawater flooding over deteriorated dykes, affecting the subsistence and livelihoods of about 3,000 people due to massive deficit in rice supplies, requiring emergency action. An important underlying goal was to prevent a massive invasion of forested areas and resulting deforestation. FIAL partnered with the Ministry of Culture, NGOs, technical officers, local leaders and the communities, conducting rapid socio-economic and physical surveys of affected areas to determine costs of an intervention, available infrastructure and appropriate use of the land.

2.11 The effort reclaimed about 3,500 ha benefiting 600 families. Benefits included bumper rice crops, better drainage, avoided deforestation, and improved local roads permitting easier transportation of product to market. Participating communities contributed in labor and/or materials. FIAL conducted participatory evaluations to follow these *bolanhas*, noting that timely community maintenance is needed with training. Each *bolanha* puts together a team of young people with music and food to raise money for any repairs – signs of salinization, deterioration – as reported by the community monitoring committees.

FIAL Methodology:

2.12 *Selection of communities and micro-projects:*

- All FIAL investment activities were conducted within the five Parks.
- A detailed Local Development Plan (LDP) methodology and approach was applied involving the entire community and emphasizing participation of vulnerable groups especially women and youth. An LDP was a requirement to participate in FIAL investment activity and could encompass several communities (*tabancas*). The

participatory methodology involved quantitative and qualitative priority-setting techniques.

- Selection of communities was done at the level of the Park Management Council based on specific selection criteria. The STP and the Local Operational Partners (POL) worked with selected communities to prepare a LDP, again a participatory process with an established methodology leading to the identification of priority MPs. Park rangers/guards and other stakeholders also participated in this process.
- Priority micro-projects emerged from community-wide consensus. Communities formed committees made up of key resource users or affected parties to lead preparation and implementation of micro-projects, e.g., for a horticulture micro-project women organized themselves in a group and selected a subset of members as group leaders.
- A specific committee was formed to work with the STP and/or the POL to develop the proposal and technical expertise was brought in as needed.
- The initial approval for a micro-project came from the FIAL Park Committee level (a subset of the Park Management Council) which checked the proposal's fit with the Park Management Plans, and did environmental and social screening – again, all this activity was within the Parks.
- The STP was responsible for ensuring technical quality and checking feasibility (financially sustainable, appropriate design for local conditions, etc).
- Simplified Local Development Plan (LDP) and micro-project preparation user guides were provided. Selection of the first communities to prepare LDPs was based on clear criteria defined in participation with park staff, local POLs, the FIAL Park Committees (CFP) and community partners and was communicated transparently to all communities in a particular park.
- FIAL was alert to the risk of elite capture of project resources when selecting the order of communities' participation, and in the selection of micro-projects within an LDP process itself.
- At project outset, it was planned that final approval would be given by the FIAL Financing Committee (CFF) at the national level but getting it to meet proved difficult and the approach was changed mid-stream, with EU approval, to allow micro-projects of under EUR \$10,000 to be approved at the CFP level. (As noted by the project team, this may have distorted incentives as people avoided presenting larger micro-projects since they preferred to get a micro-project going rather than get bogged down with the CFF).

2.13 *Micro-project execution, operation and maintenance:*

- An MP was executed by the community group with assistance from the STP and/or POL. Budget, materials and progress were closely-monitored by STP and/or POL, sharing information with selected community representatives (e.g., the Treasurer).
- Community capacity to do this alone was generally weak although there were some exceptions. Park staff were also intimately involved throughout this process.
- Contracts for the acquisition of goods and services were handled centrally by the PMU procurement staff and payments were made directly by the Project to the supplier/contractor.³⁹

³⁹ This approach made sense in the Guinea-Bissau context among the various approaches used globally. In the case of NE Brazil, funds for goods and services needed to implement a "subproject" are passed directly to the community association by the PMU for an approved investment. The association opens a bank account, pays suppliers/contractors and submits a statement of expenditures (SOE) to the PMU for resources used. This would have been difficult in Guinea-Bissau due *inter alia*, to the lack of banking/related services - although micro-credit services do exist -

- A minimum 15% community contribution was required in cash or kind, generally the latter (materials and/or labor) and work was based on a 100-day work program.
- Finally, even after formal completion, the STP/POL/Park staff remained involved and monitored ongoing operation of the respective MP, working with the maintenance committees to ensure that the MP started off on a sustainable footing. Building such capacity takes time and it was felt that departing abruptly from an MP was inappropriate. These staff evaluate when the committee is ready to stand on its own feet and support can be gradually phased out. The impact evaluations of the FIAL investments called attention to this important principle.

Table 2.13.1: Results for FIAL Activities - Estimated and Actual

Indicator	Results Expected end-Project	Results Achieved, end-Project	Percentage
Impact Indicators			
% of population of PAs with increased incomes from new knowledge, technologies and access to resources rises from 2006.	10% pa	16% pa	160%
Rate of access of populations resident in/around the PAs to basic social services increases from 2006	10% pa	7% pa	70%
At least 75% of community MPs financed annually by FIAL achieve objectives	75%	81.6%	109%
Indicators of Execution			
Functionality of FIAL Park Committees improves annually	100%	85%	85%
Functionality of FIAL Permanent Technical Secretariat (STP/FIAL) improves annually	100%	95%	95%
# of local communities in each PA with a Local Development Plan (LDP) prepared and approved increases annually	167 communities	70 communities	42%
# communities benefited with support to prepare an MP increases annually	167 communities	156 communities	93%
# MPs analyzed and approved annually by each CFP based on Operational Manual, increases annually	167 MPs	156 MPs	93%
# of MP dossiers received, with STP/FIAL technical opinion and submitted to CFF on time, increases annually	167	85	51%
% of funds disbursed for approved MPs increases annually	100%	95%	95%
Functionality of participatory management, monitoring and evaluation increases annually	100%	85%	85%
# of audits of the FIAL portfolio/account increases annually	4	4	100%

2.14 Bio-Guinea Foundation: The Bio-Guinea Foundation (FBG) was expected to be established and operational by May 2008 and needed an estimated endowment of EUR 14.0 million. Progress in setting up the BGF was slow due to the immense workload borne by the IBAP and FIAL coordinators in their respective activities. However, delays were more realistically attributed to the difficult task of establishing a location for the FBG, its objectives, statutes and structure. The expectation that it could be endowed and operational by mid-2008

especially in rural areas but it was also premature to go to this level at the time and the Project team needed to work out what was the best approach. There were also procurement and FM considerations involved.

was completely unrealistic; and the funding stage only made sense once the other elements were in place. Early progress was made on raising awareness among national decision-makers concerning FBG objectives and structure and in contacting potential donors, but launching the actual fund-raising campaign was repeatedly delayed due to donor demands regarding governance, Government contribution/other. The Bank initiated monthly, participatory audio-conferences from mid-2007 on but real progress did not come about until late 2009. As conceived, the FBG would allow for mixed financing, i.e., both endowment (untouched capital) and sinking (capital disbursed) fund accounts. Sub-accounts were also envisaged, allowing donors to earmark their financing for particular areas of interest.

2.15 The *Acta Constituinte* required for FGB establishment as a private foundation was approved in 2009 and initial funds for its registration were secured, but registration was suspended when potential donors indicated that the FGB needed to be established offshore for them to contribute. The design needed to be modified. Donor support for the FGB was predicated on three requirements: (i) the fund needed to be established in an offshore location such as the United Kingdom due to donors' lack of confidence in Guinea-Bissau's legal and financial framework; (ii) Government-appointed members of the FGB's Board of Directors should represent a minority of one-third or less of total Board membership; and (iii) potential donors should participate in the process of designing the FGB rather than be presented with a *fait accompli*, although this was more best practice than a condition applied by donors. Also, donors were more likely to support a Foundation if Government made a contribution not necessarily in cash (e.g., headquarters building, support staff). Various fund-raising sources were also suggested, e.g., IBAP to collect park entry fees and sport fishing licenses within the parks; fees from new mining and petroleum projects; international fishing agreements; and debt-for-nature swaps. The Bank worked closely with IBAP and the project team to identify and explore funding opportunities. A detailed fund-raising strategy will be developed under the follow-on project.

2.16 The status of the BGF at project closing was as follows: (i) two Board Directors were selected and one Board Member was formally appointed; (ii) articles of incorporation were finalized and validated and the FGB was legally incorporated in the UK (the international donor community preferred an offshore location); (iii) the protocol for signature by the Foundation and Government was drafted, as well as the Operational Manual; and, (iv) Government requested EUR 1.0 million in initial capitalization for the BGF as part of its commercial fisheries agreement with the EU and this is under discussion. Meanwhile, Government plans to seek another US\$2.0 - 4.0 million for FGB capitalization from the GEF5; and this request is still under discussion.

Sub-component 2: Capacity-building to strengthen the management and monitoring, control and surveillance of Reserved Fishing Zones (RFZs) and fisheries.

2.17 ***Management of Reserved Fishing Zones:*** This sub-component – added comparatively late to the project – was designed to develop and test a new practice for managing fisheries in Reserved Fishing Zones, i.e., zones located in the central portion of marine protected areas that are governed by special regulations approved by local communities. The aggregate set of activities was exceptionally complex for country conditions, the amount of resources allocated was insufficient and the two linked Key Performance Indicators were not well-designed. See main text 2.1.7 to 2.1.9 and 2.2.3.

2.18 The sub-component was to support strengthened management and capacity-building within the Orango and João Vieira RFZs – areas of economic importance and global biodiversity significance. Management and surveillance were intended to be designed and implemented with local stakeholders, in partnership with Government's fisheries extension service. Specific

activities were to include: (a) creating options plans for RFZs in Orango and João Vieira by doing social assessments and participatory resource assessments of stakeholders, habitats, resource users and management options for RFZs; (b) building capacity for RFZ management by recruiting facilitators to work with local communities and stakeholders empowering them as partners; (c) strengthening and promoting RFZs in Orango and João Vieira among local stakeholders, developing capacity to examine resource uses, establish inclusive management committees, and draft RFZ management plans for legal recognition and supporting socialization and awareness-building campaigns; (d) demarcating RFZs through buoys and maps for local fishermen including industrial and artisanal; and (e) developing local surveillance and communications skills.

2.19 *Monitoring, control and surveillance of RFZs and fisheries:* The sub-component had three parts: Monitoring would focus on establishing a Fisheries Monitoring center at the Center for Applied Fisheries Research (CIPA), as command center for a satellite-based vessel monitoring system (see PAD, Annex 2 for details of this sophisticated system). Control activities were described as requiring a significant commitment from Government. Activities supported were: (a) re-launching the national dialogue on the fisheries sector; (b) providing technical assistance for fisheries control including stocktaking exercises, and drafting a new Industrial Fisheries Management Plan; and (c) participating in regional fisheries activities/discussions/collaboration to manage trans-boundary resources. Surveillance activities: the project sought to design the most cost-effective patrol capability for the Ministry of Fisheries through a continuous presence at sea from two surveillance stations within the RFZs – Orangozinho and Caravela, and to train staff. The project would finance the two stations, equipment and patrol boats, as well as recurrent costs for the first six months of the two stations and patrols after which Government was expected to assume full budget responsibility.

Achievements and background:

2.20 Measurement of the number of infringements of the regulatory framework of the Reserved Fishing Zones (RFZ) by fishing vessels was seriously delayed by ambiguity in the legal definition and applicable regulatory framework for RFZs. This sub-component in fact supported two similar, but legally different activities: (i) preparation and implementation of Park rules and zonations for the marine areas of the Orango and João Vieira National Parks; and (ii) establishment and support for separate legal instruments to be known as RFZs in marine areas outside the Parks, e.g., Buba and others. The results indicator (KPI 1) was defined in terms of the former. A baseline could not be established until the park management plans were in place to establish the applicable regulatory framework. There was not to be a legal instrument known as a National Park and a separate legal instrument known as an RFZ within the same space in Orango and João Vieira Parks. Establishing the legal framework for RFZs took most of the project period and involved complex legal issues such as distinct treatment of RFZs within National Parks and in marine areas outside the Parks.

2.21 Following a determination by the Mid-Term Review mission that the project seemed unlikely to implement this sub-component as designed - due to complexity, budget and procurement issues, and lack of government commitment - or to achieve its two KPI which were considered poorly-designed and not essential for achieving the PDO, it was cut back to three achievable outputs: (i) a RFZ established at Buba; (ii) an operational fisheries surveillance base at Caravela; and (iii) a national fisheries strategy completed by the Government with an Action Plan for its execution. Given the multiple problems encountered in its implementation - contracting, transportation of materials, enforcement and surveillance issues around the massive area of the continental platform and the delineation of fishing reserves and institutional responsibilities -

outcomes/outputs by closing were impressive, even under the two problematic KPIs. Not surprisingly, achievements came significantly later than expected at appraisal.

2.22 Achievements and background: At closing this sub-component had achieved many successes going well beyond what could be captured by its two KPI, as shown below:

- The Buba Reserved Fishing Zone was established;
- The Caravela surveillance base was constructed, equipped, officially handed over in July 2010 and is operational utilizing the two surveillance patrol vessels financed (separately) by the Government of Turkey;
- The National Fisheries Strategy was completed with an Action Plan, and is the basis for the new West Africa/Guinea-Bissau Regional Fisheries Program, now effective;
- The legislative package comprising the Fisheries Law and Artisanal Fisheries regulations and decrees for creation of the RFZs was approved;
- The regulatory framework for the Reserved Fishing Zones was formalized through signature of the *Despacho Ministerial Conjunto* by the Ministry of Agriculture and State Secretary of Fisheries in March 2010;
- Infringements of RFZs were reduced by 10% in the first year following formulation of a baseline and initiation of regular, bi-monthly monitoring in mid-2009;
- Government started to contribute financial resources for surveillance activities/O&M in the final year, a positive development. Clearly, the Government did not have the budget resources until that point and its weak earlier performance was not due to a lack of commitment.

2.23 Surveillance and detention activities have been quite effective over time as indicated by the Marine Protected Areas of João Vieira and Poilão, and Orango National Park. Detention of illegal fishing boats was very high when surveillance first commenced in 2006 and diminished through 2008 as fishermen became more aware of Government's conservation goals and the delimits of the Protected Areas. Shortages of resources for surveillance vessel maintenance in 2009 and consequent fewer surveillance missions saw incursions rising again. However, the majority of fishermen involved were not intercepted in the core, most sensitive zones but in the margins/buffer areas with consequent increase in the numbers and diversity of fish species recorded by surveillance in more central, sensitive areas and the average size of individual fish. See table 2.23.1.

Table 2.23.1: Surveillance Results, 2006-2010
Marine Protected Areas (João Vieira/Poilão, Orango)

Year	Incursions	Detentions
2006	30	11
2007	33	6
2008	30	4
2009	25	6
2010	17	7

Component 3: Environmental and Social Safeguards Framework

2.24 This component sought to create an institutional and regulatory framework for safeguarding the country's environmental and social assets, manage the evaluation of social and environmental impacts of development projects and facilitate mainstreaming of environmental laws and regulations. The centerpiece would be establishing an Environmental Impact

Assessment (EIA) Unit (CAIA) attached to the Prime Minister's Office. CAIA would set and oversee implementation of the national standards for environmental and social safeguards for all development proposals. It would be staffed leanly with a small permanent team and access external experts as needed, and would eventually become financially independent through the introduction of a fee-for-service structure, plus Government budget. The component would support CAIA's creation and operation, as well as the development, adoption, dissemination and implementation of EIA legislation, regulations and procedures, as well as sector-specific guidelines (energy, fishing, mining and tourism).

Achievements and background:

2.25 This component had the lowest financing but made massive strides in the project period, including by leveraging partnerships and additional resources mainly to help CAIA staff attend international conferences on conservation and biodiversity. The following was achieved:

- CAIA was established in 2004 within the Prime Minister's Office and has become the institution legally representing national policy on environmental and social development.
- Institutionalization of safeguards has resulted in an emerging interest and awareness on the part of investors, planners, decision-makers and beneficiaries of investments (e.g., FIAL) in this issue;
- Environmental and social safeguards are now embodied in the country's legal system and such considerations are also reflected in sector policies affecting forests, mining, fisheries and petroleum;
- Approval and ratification of the Environmental Impact Assessment Law authorized CAIA to review EIAs for 100% of all development projects proposed, granted CAIA fee-for-service authority supporting its future sustainability, and provided Government with a positive draw-card in its negotiations with private interests who favor such laws;
- Approval of the Basic Environmental Law enables Government to regulate development processes on the basis of environmental considerations;
- Decree establishing CAIA's *Pontos Focais* and *Antenas Setoriais* - environmental focal points in key ministries/agencies and at regional levels respectively - to ensure that national safeguards policies are factored into decisions about programs, projects, and development strategies, public and private;
- Decree establishing CAIA as the National Environmental Evaluation Agency (NEEA) and its respective statutes.⁴⁰
- Preparation of nine environmental reference guides for economic sectors (e.g., Fishing, Industry, Tourism, Energy, Agriculture, Infrastructure, Water, Hydro-carbons and Mines);
- 92 projects from various sectors have been registered with CAIA since 2005 of which 53 required completion of an EIA;
- Supported project coordination staff's participation in national and international conferences and training opportunities in Guinea-Bissau, Morocco, Norway, Senegal, Portugal, Mali and Gambia;
- About 350 decision-makers, technicians and other stakeholders received training in environmental evaluation instruments and techniques;

⁴⁰ Known in Guinea-Bissau as the Agencia Nacional de Avaliacao Ambiental (ANAA).

- Numerous partnerships were established by CAIA with international bodies interested in environmental evaluation/assessment: WWF, IUCN, Regional Marine Conservation Program (PRCM), International Francophone Secretariat for Environmental Evaluation (SIFEE), West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), and REDE Lusofone for Impact Evaluation;
- However, Government's promised allocation of FCFA 50 million for CAIA (and similar amount for IBAP) from the 2010 national budget was not allotted but the Bank was informed that the issue would be re-visited: at project closing, this had not yet occurred.

Component 4: Project Management, and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

2.26 This component financed the operating costs of the PMU, its oversight and coordination structures, a multi-disciplinary Steering Committee (which ceased to function early on, without any impact on the Project) and other support groups, as well as recurrent costs and training/capacity-building. It also financed monitoring and evaluation (including periodic, independent evaluation) and the costs of progress monitoring but not the costs of outcomes/results monitoring which were covered under individual components. As noted elsewhere, shortages of funds and delayed receipt of EU trust funds affected project management and coordination by delaying activities and reducing the quality of goods and services acquired. The PMU performed well in adjusting to changes made, especially post-MTR and in using available funds cost-effectively. Partnerships were judiciously accessed for additional resources.

2.27 The Coordinators of Fisheries activities and CAIA changed in 2006 and 2007 respectively, and two changes in the national coordinator position in 2008 and 2009 and in the Executive Secretary position of FIAL. These changes not surprisingly, delayed some project activities briefly but did not throw the project off course due to the "recycling" of skilled people with long association with the Project. The Project also lost staff in the period before closing as people sought other employment, including with new Bank projects. Obligated to keep functioning, the PMU was resourceful in aggregating functions under the remaining staff, including the Coordinator of IBAP, who not only took on the PMU Coordinator position but performed an excellent job without salary.

2.28 The component financed three independent evaluations of FIAL (see Annex 5) and a good-quality Final Report, along with substantial output data collection throughout project execution.

2.29 The table below shows end-project results for output indicators listed in the PAD Project Design Summary (no targets established at appraisal):

Table 2.29.1: Performance Output Indicators - Results at End-project

Indicators	Results by End-Project
1. Protected Areas and Endangered Species Management:	A financial viable, administratively autonomous Institute for Biodiversity and Protected Areas (IBAP) manages a network of protected areas in a participatory manner, and implements endangered species action plans.
<i>Institutional strengthening</i>	
Creation of IBAP	IBAP created, staffed and strengthened
Information management and communication	Communications improved between IBAP/FIAL and local stakeholders. Communications strategy developed.
Coordinate conservation efforts with regional programs	Government supported efforts to coordinate RFZ surveillance and monitoring with neighboring

	states. Design of the new (approved) West Africa Regional Fisheries Program APL Project (Guinea-Bissau) builds off the National Fisheries Strategy developed by the CBMP. Also, IBAP established linkages on marine protected areas via RAMP AO (turtles, manatees); with Wetlands International (birds); IBAP also participates in the African Conservation Foundations Group; and IBAP coordinates and participates in the Regional Coastal and Marine Program (PRCM) on the turtle monitoring program, sharing information with neighboring countries. IBAP has become the fulcrum of Guinea-Bissau's conservation efforts.
IBAP headquarters operating cost	It is intended that IBAP HQ operating costs will eventually be partially covered by the FGB, to which the endowment of US\$3.0 m is under discussion. IBAP also leveraged emergency interim financing in 2010 and 2011 and new Bank-sponsored operations will pick up where CBMP left off. Government did not contribute to IBAP under the CBMP.
<i>Management of protected areas</i> ⁴¹	
Operation of Orango National Park (NP)	Operation of Orango NP: Governed by a Park Management Plan; Park Director and rangers are in place and operational. Over the longer-term, the FGB is expected to contribute significantly to operational costs.
Operation of João Vieira & Poilão NP	Operation of João Vieira and Poilão NP: Governed by a Park Management Plan; Park Director and rangers are in place and active. Over the longer-term, the FGB is expected to contribute significantly to operational costs.
Operation of Cacheu NP	Cacheu NP: Governed by a Park Management Plan; Park Director and rangers are in place and active. Over the longer-term, the FGB is expected to contribute significantly to operational costs.
Operation of Cufada Lagoon NP ⁴²	Cufada Lagoon NP: Governed by a Park Management Plan; Park Director and rangers in place and active. Bauxite Angola situation nearing resolution - final EIA being prepared for Bank/Government review and Action Plan is on track. Over the longer-term, the FGB is expected to contribute significantly to operational costs.
Operation of Cantanhez PA ⁴³	Cantanhez Protected Area created: Park

⁴¹ The FGB was never intended to cover all costs alone. At the end of the Project, there would not have been enough resources in the FBG for this – it was a medium to long-term objective. It is expected that in 5 years, two priority Parks will have their operational costs covered (probably Orango and João Vieira and Poilao) but this cannot be done until the FGB is fully-capitalized which will take significant time.

⁴² Including preparation and implementation of management plans.

⁴³ Creation of protected area, preparation and implementation of management plans.

	Management Plan under implementation; Park Director and rangers are in process of installation. Over the longer-term, the FGB is expected to contribute significantly to operational costs.
<i>Species conservation</i>	
Preparation and implementation of action plans for priority endangered species	Endangered species Action Plans prepared for three species: Chimpanzees, Colobus monkeys and Turtles (marine, forest and mangrove). Partial implementation initiated pre-closing.
Information sharing with national and international biodiversity networks	Regular contact maintained throughout project execution with WWF, IUCN, the MAVA Foundation and others, as well as via international conferences, e.g., Bonn, Nagoya, CBD Convention.
2. Natural Resources Management: Local communities in and around protected areas practice diverse, community-driven, sustainable use of coastal natural resources.	
<i>Community development</i>	
Implement participatory needs	129 micro-projects selected in a participatory manner by organized communities and implemented successfully.
Manage provision of matching grants	FIAL effectively managed the provision of matching grants to 156 communities under the conservation-based CDD sub-component. Communities contributed approx. an average 29% of micro-project cost in labor/materials.
Monitoring, evaluation and auditing of micro-projects	129 micro-projects monitored. Three evaluations conducted with satisfactory outcomes. FIAL accounts audited annually for 4 years with satisfactory results.
<i>Conservation Foundation (Bio-Guinea)</i>	
Design and catalyze set up of Foundation for long-term IBAP/FIAL financing mechanism	Bio-Guinea Foundation legally incorporated under UK Law, March 2011. Initial capitalization of FGB under discussion with EU and from GEF5 (estimated total of around US\$3-5 million)
<i>Reserved Fishing Zones (RFZ)</i>	
Conduct baseline social and participatory resource assessments underpinning de-limitation and regulation of RFZ	Baseline social and participatory resource assessments conducted for National Fisheries Strategy. RFZs de-limited and regulated.
Convene public discussion on proposed local fisheries regulations	Public discussions convened and local fisheries regulations drafted and approved.
Promote artisanal fisheries law and the RFZ regulations	Fisheries Law and the Artisanal Fisheries regulations and decrees for creation of the Reserve Fishing Zones (RFZ) were approved by Council of Ministers in January 2010 and promulgated/published.
Prepare and implement participatory surveillance of RFZ	Boats acquired for Caravela Surveillance Post and participatory surveillance of RFZ activated/operational.
Coordinate RFZ efforts with other national fisheries sector efforts	PMU worked with Ministry of Fisheries on this (but not always supportive). RFZ efforts became part of the Ministry's work especially since the former PMU fisheries coordinator is now Minister of Fisheries.
Launch national debate on sustainable fisheries	Debate/dialogue launched, resulting in approval of National Fisheries Strategy. International

	Conference did not occur (lack of resources). Ministry is main stakeholder -with other Govt. agencies and Parliament - together with European Union which is main buyer of fishing licenses.
<i>Monitoring Control and Surveillance</i>	
Operations of two stations at Orangozinho and Caravela	Caravela station constructed and operational. Orangozinho station did not proceed due to budget issues.
Setting up a vessel monitoring system	Vessel monitoring system established and operational, with some Govt. budget support for O&M.
3. Environmental and Social safeguards Framework: Environmental and social impacts of major public and private sector development projects evaluated.	
<i>EIA capacity building</i>	
Prepare sector policies for environmental impact assessments (EIA)	(i) Environmental Impact Assessment Law and <i>Despacho conjunto</i> approved by Parliament (2010), promulgated and published; (ii) Basic Environmental Law (<i>Lei de Bases do Ambiente</i>) promulgated/published in Official Bulletin (2011).
Coordinate the implementation of international conventions (Biodiversity, Ramsar, CITES and Bonn)	IBAP monitored/coordinated compliance with international conventions in the parks and RFZ. Compliance considered satisfactory with exception of Cufada Park.
Implement awareness campaign for public and private sector decision-makers and investors	Awareness-building/communications strategy prepared and disseminated to the extent possible.
Train EIA practitioners in government institutions	Decree created the <i>Antenas Setoriais</i> (Sector Antennas), an arm of CAIA, located within key ministries/agencies to train EIA practitioners, and to integrate and institutionalize the environmental agenda/ analysis into policies and programs
Apply environmental impact assessment laws, regulations and procedures	CAIA legally created as the National Environmental Assessment Agency (ANAA in Port.). Now applying EIA laws/regulations to all new development proposals. CAIA now has authority to charge fees/service, but fees not yet established and system not yet initiated.
4. Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation: Project Management Unit (PMU) is operational and adaptively managing the project.	
<i>Steering Committee and Donor Committee</i>	
Bi-annual planning review of M&E results	Steering Committee did not function. M&E practices and results were reviewed bi-annually by IBAP/Bank teams. IBAP prepared annual M&E reports.
Integration of national and international initiatives	Partnerships established with international bodies for knowledge transfer, fund-raising and standardization/compliance purposes.
<i>Project Management Unit</i>	
Operating cost	Operating costs reviewed regularly in collaboration with Bank missions throughout implementation. Cost savings achieved through scaling back selected activities and reallocation among categories.
Training	Diverse training opportunities including external, provided to Country project team and selected

	stakeholders.
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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

3.1 At appraisal, due to its primarily institutional focus – establishing a new institutional framework and strengthening the capacity of stakeholders to manage biodiversity and Protected Areas – the Project was deemed as not lending itself to traditional cost-benefit analysis and estimation of rates of return. However, during preparation of the related IDA-financed Guinea-Bissau Rural Community-Driven Development Project (P090712) a detailed analysis was conducted of five representative micro-projects financed by the CBMP's Fund for Local Environmental Initiatives (FIAL).⁴⁴ The analysis shows that FIAL's production and income-generating micro-projects had positive Internal Rates of Return (IRR) and Net Present Value (NPV). For micro-projects that provide public goods, e.g., schools, an incremental cost analysis was used, but in the case of water wells, which can have both positive public health and economic impacts simultaneously, the analysis was based on the value of time saved – time that can be used for productive activities.

3.2 Table 3.2.1 shows a summary of the analytical results for several types of micro-projects typically selected by communities for FIAL funding.

Table 3.2.1: Economic and Effectiveness Performance of FIAL Micro-Projects

Micro-project	Investment (CFA)	IRR %	NPV (CFA)	Incremental Cost and Benefits
Rehabilitation of dykes for <i>bas fond</i> rice	1,970,000	21.17	219,688	
Rehabilitation of dykes for mangrove rice	5,200,000	28.87	1,481,593	
Water wells	6,946,892	22.81	5,283,260	
Palm oil production	2,160,000	50.13	8,241,891	
School buildings	14,299,441			- Incremental cost per student: 45%. - Incremental output per student: 466%

3.3 The first example, rehabilitation of rice dykes in low lands (*bas fonds*), had an IRR of 21%, but a relatively low NPV. However, this type of micro-project is important because it permits a more intensive use of existing low lands, thus reducing substantially the need to deforest neighboring areas as usually occurs in the absence of a dyke.

3.4 The second example is for rice grown in mangrove areas (*bolanhas*) where the dykes are used for flood control. Rice yields in these fields are higher than in low land rice, as shown by the IRR and NPV.

3.5 The third example is the construction of water wells where the key variable is the value of time saved by having the well close to home. Since farmers – both men and women – grow crops and vegetables for subsistence and, to a lesser extent, for the market, time spent fetching

⁴⁴ See PAD, Guinea-Bissau Rural Community-Driven Development Project (P090712), Report #49557-GW.

water does have an opportunity cost. As a result, the IRR of the water well is 22% and the NPV quite high, since a well can produce benefits for 20 years.

3.6 The fourth example, a palm-oil micro-project – generally administered by women's groups – shows high returns, since cash sales in nearby markets are a good source of income. The IRR exceeds 50% and the NPV is over 8 million FCFA.

3.7 Finally, in the case of construction of a primary school, the analysis of the incremental costs shows that the cost per student increases by 45%. *Prima facie*, this increase looks high but in reality only reflects the dismal amount of budget resources spent on schools at the time of the analysis. The benefits of a new school are shown in the overall increase in student output: 466% higher than the output at the outset.

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending			
Yves Prevost			Environment, Ecology, Safeguards
Tanya Yudelman			Environ., Community Development
Michel Simeon			Livestock, Biodiversity, Econ.
Peter Kristensen			Env., M&E, Conserv.
Sergio Margulis			Resource Economics
Dan Owen			Soc. Devt., CDD
Adriana Moreira			Biodiversity, Foundations
Jurai Mesik			Community Foundations
Alberto Ninio			Env. Law, Foundations
Liba Feldblyum			Operations, Disburst.
Fily Sissoko			FM Specialist
Bourama Diaite			Procurement Spec.
Nina Doetinchem			Global Env. Spec.
Dirk Prevoo			Env., Operations
Carmen Pereira			Guinea-Bissau Liaison Officer
Serigne Omar Fye			Env., Soc. Safeguards
Robert Robelus			Env. Safeguards
Amadou Konare			Env. Safeguards
Kristine Ivarsdotter			Social Safeguards
Gordon Appleby			Social Safeguards
John Virdin			Fisheries
Supervision/ICR			
Adriana Moreira	Sr Environmental Specialist	LCSEN	Env. Quality
Africa Eshogba Olojoba	Sr Environmental Specialist	AFTEN	Env. Quality
Alberto Ninio	Lead Counsel	LEGEN	Legal Issues
Bourama Diaite	Senior Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	Proc. Supervision
Cheick Traore	Senior Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	Proc. Supervision
Eduardo Brito	Sr Counsel	LEGAF	Legal Issues
Gary J. R. McMahon	Sr Mining Specialist	COCPO	Mining Issues
John Virdin	Sr Natural Resources Mgmt. Specialist	AFTEN	TTL/NRM/Fishery
Laurent Mehdi Brito	Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	Proc. Supervision
Liba C. Strengerowski-Feldblyum	Operations Analyst	AFTEN	TTL/Operations

Luz Meza-Bartrina	Sr Counsel	LEGAF	Legal Issues
Marie-Jeanne Ndiaye	Program Assistant	IEGSE	Oper. Assistant
Miles Scott-Brown	Consultant	COCPO	
Osval Rocha Andrade Romão	Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	FM Supervision
Peter Kristensen	Sector Leader	AFTEN	TTL/Environment
Tanya Lisa Yudelman	Consultant	AFTEN	Oper. Specialist
Virginie A. Vaselopoulos	Language Program Assistant	AFTEN	
Xavier F. P. Vincent	Sr Fisheries Specialist	AFTEN	Fisheries
Yves Andre Prevost	Lead Environment Specialist	AFTEN	Environment, Ecology, Safeguards
Anna Roumani	Consultant	LCSAR	ICR Preparation
Barry Spergel	Consultant/Lawyer		Conservation Trust Fund Specialist
Paul Siegel	Consultant	WWF	Env. Specialist
Daan Vreugdenhil	Consultant	AFTEN	Protected Areas Manag. Specialist

(b) Staff Time and Cost: P083453

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY98	0	0
FY99	0	0
FY00	0	0
FY01	0	0
FY02	0	0
FY03	0	0
FY04	7.45	79,218
FY05	0	0
LEN Total:	7.45	79,218
Supervision/ICR		
FY05	3.75	11,052
FY06	19.34	44,540
FY07	22.46	79,579
FY08	25.80	195,730
FY09	16.98	170,685
FY10	8.45	125,171
FY11	13.06	85,115
SPN Total:	117.29	791,090
	229.49	1,755,445

Staff Time and Cost: P049513

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY98	0	73,922
FY99	0	145
FY00	5.04	97,426
FY01	6.56	80,774
FY02	9.79	86,373
FY03	6.38	61,026
FY04	25.01	140,479
FY05	4.27	17,797
Total:	57.05	557,943
Supervision/ICR		
FY05	6.95	32,439
FY06	7.34	87,123
FY07	9.48	94,240
FY08	6.76	74,621
FY09	11.46	51,608
FY10	8.60	44,298
FY11	4.56	22,083
FY12	na	na
	55.15	406,412
Aggregate total:	112.20	964,355

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

5.1 Micro-projects (MP) financed in the five Parks – Cantanhez, Cacheu, Cufada, Orango and João Vieira e Poilão - under the FIAL community-based investment sub-component were the subject of three evaluations based on the segmented implementation of micro-projects due to delivery of EU resources in three installments. Field surveys used semi-structured and/or open interviews designed to promote candid discussions with beneficiaries and a wide range of local stakeholders to determine levels of beneficiary satisfaction (consistent with the FIAL-related Key Performance Indicator) and to assess positive and negative aspects of the program. Formal sampling and control groups were not used. The ICR summarizes findings of the final evaluation of selected, more recent investments.⁴⁵ All three evaluations can be accessed in IRIS.

Final Evaluation of Micro-projects Implemented in Protected Areas (d’Alva 2011)

5.2 The final evaluation assessed 45 more recently-financed MPs divided unevenly between the five Parks.⁴⁶ Consultants interviewed the Park Director, beneficiaries, POLs and AABs, and other organizations involved in the parks to obtain local information on available services such as training, transport and credit. To obtain an indicator of MP performance, the team scored certain factors using the Rapid Organizational and Technical Appraisal methodology.⁴⁷ Evaluation results have been grouped into several categories, as below:

5.3 *Impact and satisfaction:*

- *MPs had positive social, environmental and economic impacts on beneficiaries* regardless of specific type, and the concept of working in groups took hold successfully.
- *Incomes increased* due to higher levels of production from the introduction of new technologies for production and processing.
- *Satisfaction levels were universally high*, especially on the part of direct beneficiaries who identified many positive aspects of the FIAL intervention and made suggestions to improve future similar interventions.
- *Beneficiaries felt stronger*, above all due to training and support for their organizations, but lamented the lack of literacy training especially for women, which they felt needed more attention.

⁴⁵ It was noted that many of the conclusions defined by the evaluation of the Pilot FIAL experience were replicated verbatim in the final evaluation.

⁴⁶ Cantanhez 4; Cufada 16; Cacheu 21; Orango 2; João Vieira & Poilao 2.

⁴⁷ Types of MPs assessed/visited were: renovated wells; community schools; mangrove *bolanha* rice paddies; lowland rice paddies; beekeeping/honey; community stores; basic health posts; and horticulture.

- *The amount of beneficiary counterpart share/contribution to implemented MPs was satisfactory taking into account labor and materials available (local construction materials, food, sleeping quarters for laborers etc).*
- *The sustainability of FIAL objectives was evident from certain entities such as Management Committees which demonstrated the social engagement of the community in awareness-building and mobilization.*
- *Gender was an MP focus despite the dominant presence of men in leadership positions (unless the MP was female-focused).*
- *Communities participated at all stages from MP diagnosis, to conceptualizing a proposal, to implementation, and community counterpart contribution was provided as envisaged.*
- *100% of MPs were subjected to an environmental impact assessment.*
- *Micro-projects, especially those designed to generate income, resulted in reduced pressure on the environment (forests, mangroves and the river) because they provided viable alternatives to families and the general community.*

5.4 ***Evidence of social capital formation:***

- *FIAL's participatory methodology/approach, and the MPs implemented, was accepted by beneficiary populations as a vehicle for analyzing their problems and formulating solutions short- and long-term.*
- *Local communities' capacity to analyze their problems and formulate solutions increased, as did their ability to evaluate the institutional environment of their communities (tabancas), with some communities even using their Local Development Plans (PDL) to jointly mobilize resources from other development partners.*
- *Communities' receptivity to FIAL's methods and objectives improved their organizational capacity and this confirms the potential institutional sustainability at the community/tabanca level but it needs reinforcing through greater support to communities to find their own solutions.*
- *Indicators should be defined for the period following emancipation of the MP to beneficiaries. Such indicators could provide a snapshot of the moment when FIAL can diminish its level of intervention in a community and transfer responsibility to the community members.*
- *Greater engagement and responsiveness on the part of communities and their leaders was observed in the land-locked parks, than those in Coastal/Island areas. This may be explained by the fact that most leaders of the Island parks lacked training in organization, structured management, resource mobilization and leadership.*

5.5 ***Communication, dissemination and engagement:***

- *Weaknesses were evident in the level of communication between FIAL and its partners at both the regional and local levels, especially with local administrations. Despite*

partnership agreements with local community radio, the objectives and mission of FIAL were not sufficiently disseminated resulting in scant knowledge of FIAL among some targeted populations and a tendency to attribute FIAL financing to the Local Operational Partners (POL).

- *Many MPs lacked identifying signage*, creating some confusion since other development entities were also working in these same areas.
- *Some local organization and indirect beneficiaries in particular, while understanding the logic of FIAL pilot interventions, felt little involvement in the MP cycle and in sharing the opportunities and benefits of collective management of conservation zones.*
- *There was also a more general tendency to see FIAL as the exclusive solution to community problems* leaving under-utilized other outside resources and those of other development partners who also form part of the institutional environment of the community.

5.6 ***Lessons and recommendations:***

- *Communities need to be informed up front about the amount of financing they will receive for their micro-project and who will be managing these resources* to avoid discontent, suspicion and alienation from the entire micro-project cycle. Direct management of resources by the community, whether through their committee or otherwise, builds social capital and maintains transparency.
- *The predominance of technicians with rural engineering qualifications meant that the cultural traditions of some communities did not receive adequate attention in some approved micro-projects* (e.g., recuperation of rice paddies) which had the potential to cause social and economic harm and consequently, the abandonment of a particular micro-project.
- *Some types of MPs have a poor track record and need careful analysis.* Palm oil presses were on occasion unsuitable for local conditions, were fragile, difficult to move, and due to their design and need for technical assistance were very expensive; similarly, community stores had not been successful in the *Orango* and *João Viera e Poilão* Parks and it appears these experiences were not sufficiently evaluated before the financing of similar micro-projects in the final sample evaluated; and, fish processing MPs needed better analysis concerning the market availability of fish and market opportunities/outlets for the finished product. Finally, O&M arrangements should be (and were) a mandatory element of micro-project design.
- *In all Parks, some MPs were not concluded, or funds were inadequate, or the contracted firm was paid without finishing the work.* Part of the reason may be that the prolonged absence of ATLs prevented the efficient monitoring of micro-projects. There needed/needs to be greater synergy and cooperation between the ATLs and Park Directors who are closer to the beneficiaries, and with the Directors having more responsibility for supervising/monitoring the micro-projects and certifying the disbursement of resources. Local communities need to be advised/guided in using their LDPs to negotiate and mobilize new partnerships to ensure the implementation of uninitiated or incomplete micro-projects.

- *Implementation of MPs ought to directly involve services or structures of government responsible for executing certain longer-term programs.* Those responsible for the programs are poorly-represented in the CFPs and the coordination of services in most regions needs improvement.
- *Reinforce the organizational capacity of tabancas to improve their ability to resolve their problems locally.* Promote the participatory development of technologies with strong linkages to the area of intervention. The exchange of experiences – technical and organizational - between *tabancas* or communities in the Parks should be part of this methodology;
- *Development of the tabancas needs inputs from outside such as savings and credit systems or cereals banks.* Despite the high level of participation, the strategy may not be lasting because rural people are accustomed to owning little. The intervention of other institutions dedicated to these functions should be stimulated to develop these activities, since FIAL, for strategic reasons, does/did not do it;
- *It is important to implement a gender analysis in the protected areas/parks principally in communities benefited to inject the basic principle: “distribution of task and responsibilities, access to control of resources and benefits” and apply it in an integrated way.* Support for women must be reinforced to give them greater access to and control of production and benefits in negotiation with men and those responsible in the communities. Further, women need training in more complex techniques to increase their earning power, and to be encouraged to participate more actively in community organizations. Inter-*tabanca* visits and exchanges of experiences can stimulate thinking about the resolution of similar problems.
- *Communities which do not have access to mangrove bolanhas but who cultivate rice in the highlands, essentially a female occupation, must not be overlooked.* Strategies for existing systems should be discussed with these groups (women and small-scale producers) to identify bottlenecks and ways to improve production qualitatively and quantitatively through technical and/or organizational means.
- *Particular attention is needed to strengthening grassroots organizations (AABs),* most of which have limited institutional capacity to either sustain the longer-term program or to seek autonomous solutions for newly-arising problems which the community might face. Support is needed to promote the internal organizational consolidation of *tabancas* for greater access to and sustainable management of Protected Area resources.
- *Clear criteria were not defined to gauge the number or level of FIAL investments needed in different communities,* with the result that some communities got more investments. To avoid this situation, a baseline study needs to be done to establish indicators of development, i.e., the critical mass of assets, services and social capital in different target communities.
- *Lines and content of communication need major improvement,* principally with local authorities who are local development coordinators and to promote alliances with potential partners in the zone keeping in mind the importance of strengthening and harmonizing activities. Further, there needs to be better collaboration with local

associations and local radio to diffuse/disseminate information about conservation, and including inter-active opportunities for community organizations to transmit their messages and experiences.

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

NA

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

A. Summary of Borrower's ICR:⁴⁸

Main factors affecting project results:

7.1 The project was affected from its preparation phase to its implementation phase by turbulent external factors in Guinea-Bissau which were outside the control, directly or indirectly, of the PMU. To illustrate this, the external factors can be described in two different phases:

7.2 The first phase (1997-2004) corresponds to the project preparation and negotiation period. This phase was extensive and lasted about seven years. It was characterized by political, institutional and military upheavals. Project preparation was interrupted in 1998 by a military/political conflict which led to a civil war, completely paralyzing economic and institutional life for a year. In 2000, following presidential and legislative elections, the project preparation and negotiation process resumed along with the re-launching of the Guinea-Bissau Coastal Planning Program. During this period, the Supreme Commander of the Military Forces was killed, accused of attempting a *coup d'état* against the Government.

7.3 Launching of the CBMP was disrupted by institutional and political instability and various coup attempts seeking to change the constitutional order. However, this situation came to absorb even more time with the *coup d'état* of 2003 which dismissed the President. From that date onwards, the country came to be ruled by a transitional President and Government until legislative elections were conducted in 2004 and presidential in 2005. In this period, despite instability, it was possible to conclude project preparation, negotiation and even obtain GEF and World Bank approval of the CBMP project.

7.4 The second phase (2005-2010) corresponds to the CBMP implementation phase. Project effectiveness was hit again by political/military instability involving the assassination of the Chief of the Armed Forces before the presidential elections of 2005. From this time on, the country continued to go through difficult periods with different focal points of instability whether military, parliamentary or political, culminating on March 1-2, 2009 in the assassination of the President and the Chief of the Armed Forces.

7.5 Throughout this period of uncertainty the project also saw difficult moments as a consequence of the national political situation. The end of the project was projected as December 31, 2010 but due to problems requiring resolution, namely: initiation of construction of the Buba port in the Cufada Park, and pending approval of the Environmental Impact Assessment Law, the Government felt obliged to request an extension of the project for one year. This extension also allowed another year for FIAL activities to permit the disbursement of available (EU) funds. It is worth noting that FIAL started a year later than the other project components.

7.6 In the middle of negotiations for extending the project, the country was once again buffeted by the events of April 1, 2010 which resulted in the dismissal of the Chief of the Armed Forces, and imprisonment for several hours of the Prime Minister.

⁴⁸ The PMU did not include an Executive Summary in its Final Report. The text above is taken from the Final Report as a proxy and informally translated.

Budget-related factors affecting the project:

7.7 In regard to project execution, there were factors attributed to different actors: the Government, the PMU, the three core institutions (IBAP, FIAL and CAIA) and the World Bank.

7.8 **Initial Phase:** In regard to the initial phase, the Project received initial deposits into the Special Account for IDA and GEF about two months after the date of effectiveness due to problems with authorized signatures for those accounts, which in turn delayed the acquisition of goods and services and recruiting of personnel for the project. Also, the fact that the Project did not have a national counterpart funds account complicated acquisitions because the committee members for evaluating bids were not motivated because they were not paid commissions. These difficulties were overcome when the Bank agreed to pay such fees.

7.9 Another obstacle was the joint instead of parallel financing of the Project budget (percentage division of the financing for each activity). The Bank overcame this with PMU collaboration; the division was corrected in the first year by attributing to each budget line a single financing. Further, the opening of second generation accounts, designated in the PAD and PIP but not in the Loan Agreement and consequently neither in the Disbursement Letter, and the impossibility of their regeneration due to delay in receiving justifications from the components benefited, was another difficulty which delayed project implementation. The Bank decided to cancel these accounts in the first year. Another cause of delay was the suspension of disbursements because the PPF account was not closed by the Project, which was overcome by joint action of the PMU and Ministry of Finances.

7.10 The four international technical assistants were contracted about two years after project start-up due to insufficient funds (US Dollar devaluation of about 30%) and delayed procurement processing. While dollar devaluation was a major obstacle to project execution, as well as the rapid rise in the prices of fuels and lubricants, under-estimation of the project's operational costs (most project activities were in the countryside) was also very important.

7.11 Inadequate understanding/knowledge of Bank procedures on the part of people recruited for the Project was overcome thanks to systematic training by the Bank and by contracted consultant trainers who prepared and/or explained the manuals of procedures.

7.12 To ensure good project execution, the Bank and Ministry of Finances came to an agreement with qualified personnel in the Private Sector Rehabilitation Project for technical assistance in project Financial Management and Procurement.

7.13 Another factor was the delayed provision of EU Trust Funds which unbalanced the project budget because the IDA Credit had to support the pilot phase of the FIAL micro-projects which ought to have been financed by the EU funds. The delivery of the EU funds in three installments was also a cause of delay in the execution of the FIAL micro-projects.

Project execution:

7.14 The factors described above influenced the quality of goods and services purchased, and also as project resources decreased, certain activities could not be executed in the desired manner and goods and services of high quality could not be purchased. Thanks to the efforts of project personnel, and to the good administration of available resources, the Project was able to achieve

its objectives in a satisfactory manner. The project also resorted to partnerships with other donors to leverage additional resources.

7.15 In the second and third years of the Project, the coordinators of the Fisheries activities and of CAIA were changed, while the Project coordinator changed twice as well as the FIAL Secretary position. Some project activities were delayed briefly as a result. Also, delayed construction of surveillance posts under the Fisheries sub-component saw its resources reduced and transferred to IBAP and CAIA which were experiencing insufficient funds.

7.16 Another obstacle was Government's non-compliance with its obligation under the project to conserve nature which prejudiced the Cufada Park due to forest clearing for road and port construction at Buba which devastated part of the Park area. The Government presented Bauxite Angola with a request for compensation for damage caused to the Park and an Action Plan has been implemented.

Final phase:

7.17 Due to the imminent ending of the Project, staff left for other employment, including with new Bank projects. This caused delays in the final stages but the PMU remedied the situation by aggregating functions under fewer positions. Finally, of the contribution programmed from Government, only the Fisheries activities benefited with US\$812,500 for building the Caravela Maritime Surveillance Center. Government also contributed by exempting from taxes imported goods acquired for the project, with exemptions totaling US\$372,000.

Sustainability:

7.18 Sustainability of project achievements was discussed from the time the Project was conceived. This idea imposed a qualitative change on proposed development, precisely to ensure the durability of advances achieved. At a time when project financing was becoming increasingly scarce and unpredictable, it was fundamental to introduce mechanisms permitting continuity and independence for conservation and biodiversity programs. This was behind the creation of IBAP and its continuity through a minimal burden on a State with minimal resources via the Bio-Guinea Foundation.

7.19 IBAP's sustainability will depend on: (i) sufficient capital for a basic patrimony permitting minimum acceptable functionality; (ii) an adequate control structure with satisfactory management rules; (iii) a robust institutional framework permitting good relationships between IBAP, the Foundation and the Ministry; and (iv) engagement of beneficiaries and other sectors and interest groups to participate in conservation activities promoted by the Program.

7.20 Project sustainability does not only depend on or flow from the macro level – the Foundation. FIAL acts at the micro level financing grass-roots initiatives which satisfy the immediate needs of communities, with common interests; training of communities to participate in implementing these initiatives is the second goal and includes their monitoring and evaluating environmental impacts, managing biodiversity and the sustainable use of natural resources in the parks. However, other factors such as literacy, community organization and poverty will influence the sustainability of conservation initiatives.

Lessons learned:

7.21 Many lessons were learned and should be taken into account in the future to avoid certain errors. The following lessons are among the more important:

- Complications arise when trying to manage a project with completely different disbursement and monitoring and evaluation procedures; ⁴⁹ this was the case with a project involving four separate donor organizations – the Bank, EU, IUCN and Government;
- Indicators were very ambitious: fisheries had two impact indicators to be achieved in five years. Experience showed that their achievement would be very difficult in the time allotted;
- The procurement system, while obligatory, was not successful within the project framework. The requirements of the financial institutions for the transparent purchasing of goods based on the quality/price relationship, was poorly interpreted throughout project execution. The Project opted to purchase cheap goods of poor quality.
- Selection criteria for personnel were not well-defined. Subjective factors seem to have carried significant weight on occasion and had an effect on project execution over the period. The PMU believed that with clearer criteria, more competent personnel could have been selected in some cases.
- The Parks lacked qualified personnel and needed an intermediate function with a scientific profile between the Director and the park rangers/guards. Further, the means at the disposal of the parks were limited considering the size of the official area protected. There were inadequate vehicles and their quality was poor. The principle of staff rotation was also not adopted and there was no infrastructure where park guards could stay when away from their home areas.
- NGOs were very helpful to the Project but the quality and capacity of many were poor and many were interested more in self-promotion. Even with project training, the products of NGOs (park development plans and micro-projects) were often of inadequate quality and needed a lot of additional work/time to improve.

⁴⁹ The Bank managed the EU funds in a way designed to minimize this.

B. Letter from the Client commenting on the Bank's ICR

**Exma. Senhora
Liba Feldblyum
TTL do Projecto Biodiversidade
Guiné-Bissau
Banco Mundial**

N/Ref. 155/IBAP/2011
Bissau, 21 de Outubro de 2011

Assunto: Comentários – Relatório de conclusão do Projecto CBMP.

Queiram aceitar os nossos melhores cumprimentos.

Depois de análise detalhada do relatório de conclusão do Projecto da Gestão da Biodiversidade e Zona Costeira da Guiné-Bissau (CMBP), O Instituto da Biodiversidade e das Áreas Protegidas, vem através desta expor o seguinte:

- 1º. Concordamos e aceitamos os “ratings” de avaliação estabelecidos no relatório de conclusão do projecto CMBP;
- 2º. Concernentes aos objectivos e aos indicadores do projecto, concordamos e demos a nossa anuência as análises feitas;
- 3º. Estamos perfeitamente de acordo com o desempenho do governo e do Banco Mundial durante a vigência do projecto, e
- 4º. As lições aprendidas reflectem as realidades da Guiné-Bissau. Elas poderão ser replicadas nos outros projectos.

Sem mais assunto de momento, queira aceitar, os protestos da nossa elevada consideração.

Atentamente

Alfredo Simão da Silva
Director-Geral do IBAP

Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

N/A

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

A. Bank:

Project Appraisal Document (Report No. 28166-GUB), October 13, 2004
Project Appraisal Document (Report No. 49557-GW), August 28, 2009
Supervision ISRs
Supervision Aide Memoires
Audit, Financial Management and Procurement Reports
IDA Development Credit Agreement (IDA 3997 GUB)
Global Environmental Facility Trust Fund Grant Agreement (GEF TF 53348 GUB)
European Commission Grant Agreement (Trust Fund 090557-GUB)
Internal Memoranda
Fisheries Strategy, Guinea-Bissau

B. Government of Guinea-Bissau/PMU:

Borrower Completion Report: Relatorio Final – Projeto de Gestao da Biodiversidade e Zona Costeira da Guine-Bissau (PMU, 2011)

Evaluation Reports:




- Evaluation of the FIAL Pilot Micro-projects (Vaz, d’Alva and Badji, 2008)
- Evaluation of FIAL Micro-projects (Vaz, d’Alva and Badji, 2009)
- Final Evaluation of FIAL Micro-projects (d’Alva 2011)

- Relatorio sobre o Estado de Implementacao do FIAL (N’Bunde, September 2009)
- Annual Activity Reports
- Annual Monitoring and Evaluation Reports
- Legislative proposals and analyses

Other:

- Managing Biodiversity to Ensure Development
- Strategy for Protected Areas and Biodiversity Conservation in Guinea-Bissau 2007-2011
- Management Manual for Protected Areas in Guinea-Bissau
- Parks of Guinea-Bissau: Evaluation of Management Efficiency in Protected Areas
- Maps of Protected Areas
- Map of Soil Occupation, 2007
- Map of Biodiversity and Prospects for Mineral Resource Exploitation
- Marine Turtles of Guinea-Bissau (2009, English and Portuguese)
- Medicinal Plants of Orango Park (2010)
- “*Bemba di Vida* – Biodiversity in the Service of Development”, a film to promote the Bio-Guinea Foundation
- Exhibition on biodiversity and food security, “*N’ha Terra*” promoted globally.

GUINEA-BISSAU
COASTAL AND BIODIVERSITY MANAGEMENT PROJECT
NATIONAL SYSTEM OF PROTECTED AREAS

 NATIONAL AND NATURAL PARKS
 RESERVED FISHING ZONES
 BIOSPHERE RESERVE

 PENDING OFFICIAL PROTECTED AREAS

 REGION CAPITALS
 NATIONAL CAPITAL

— • — INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

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